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I. INTRODUCTION
Despite a virtual avalanche of patent studies issued during the past few
years, simple but fundamental questions necessary to address patent
reform remain unanswered.  Most importantly, the studies do not tell us 
whether the currency of the patent system—the patent itself—is the core
part of the problem.  Is patent quality the cause of patent woes?  Are 
litigants the problem?  Current studies do not disaggregate these questions. 
This study adds to the literature by considering every outcome of every 
patent in every case, and finding that litigation choices drive outcomes 
more than anything observable on the face of the patent.  That is, whom 
the parties sue and other choices are more likely to predict patent invalidity 
than any measurable aspect of the patent. 
Patent quality is a slippery concept; there are many ways to consider
quality, such as disclosure and technology breadth.1  Perhaps the simplest
measure of quality is whether a patent is valid, that is, whether it is novel,
nonobvious, and otherwise compliant with the Patent Act.2  Validity 
quality can only be observed when a court finally adjudicates a patent, but 
patents are never adjudicated valid.  Instead, courts merely rule that they 
will survive this challenge, and the next time could be different. 
1. See R. Polk Wagner, Understanding Patent-Quality Mechanisms, 157 U. PA. L.
REV. 2135, 2138 (2009) (describing the difference between quality and value); see also 
Michael Risch, Patent Portfolios as Securities, 63 DUKE L.J. 89, 137–51 (2013) (surveying
various methods for valuing patents). 
2. See Michael Risch, Everything Is Patentable, 75 TENN. L. REV. 591, 594 (2008) 
(“Thus, this Article assumes that maximum social value is obtained by the issuance of only
those patents that are justified under the statute.”); Wagner, supra note 1, at 2138. 
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Moreover, most cases settle without ever ruling on the patent, and the 
issue of whether the patent would have eventually been invalidated is 
never resolved.  Because actual invalidity rulings are rare, there are very 
few observations available to predict when patents are of low quality, that 
is, invalid. 
This study changes that by examining patents that are tested on the
merits—and those that are not—over twenty-five years, allowing a peek
into the lifespan of each patent instead of just one case.  This Article
follows Patent Troll Myths,3 which studied the ten most litigious patent
licensors—some might call them trolls—and their litigation over a 
twenty-five year period.  Starting with these highly litigious nonpracticing
entities (NPEs), we identified a set of random patent plaintiffs (nonNPEs) 
selected to match the rate of assertion over the same twenty-five year 
period and gathered all of the cases involving their asserted patents.
This Article reports many of the results of that comparison: some that
are surprising, some that are not, and some that are consistent with other 
studies. The ten primary findings follow, though there are many more 
throughout:
1.	 Complexity. The highly litigious NPEs generally filed more complex
cases: more defendants per case, more interdistrict transfers and 
consolidations, more patents per case, and more cases for each patent. 
2.	 Duration. All else equal, the NPE litigation studied here was shorter 
than nonNPE litigation, with higher settlement rates. Of course, the 
NPEs did things that would lengthen any litigation more often, such
as suing many defendants.  Even so, NPE litigation was shorter. 
3.	 Comparative Invalidation. Patents asserted by the highly litigious 
NPEs were invalidated twice as often as their randomly selected
counterparts’ patents, or in about half of the cases where there was a 
test of the patent’s validity. 
4.	 Small Magnitude. However, very few patents were actually tested
on the merits.  This occurred in about 7% of the cases, with
invalidations in about half of those.
5.	 Later Invalidation.  In data collected unique to this study, about 17%
of the untested NPE cases involved patents that were partially or
completely invalidated in some other case.  This is more than five 
times the 3% of random cases involving a patent later invalidated. 
3. 	 Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 457 (2012). 
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6.	 Untested Patents.  More than 75% of the litigious NPE cases involved
patents that were never tested on the merits and did not involve a 
patent later invalidated.  One’s perception of these cases depends in
large part on inferences about settlements. 
7.	 Contention Predicts Invalidation. It turns out that invalidity
findings are better predicted by whom these NPEs sued than who they
are. The best explanation for when patent invalidation occurred included 
high stakes cases with many defendants, hotly contested patents, or 
otherwise heavily defended cases.  The NPEs were more likely to be
involved in such cases because they sued more defendants more often
in remote districts.  Once this selection effect was considered, NPE 
status had no statistically significant impact.  Product companies that
sued more defendants at once were also invalidated more often. 
8.	 Backward Citations Imply Lower Quality. The data also shows— 
surprisingly again—that a key metric of patent quality, namely a 
patent’s citations to other inventions, is negatively correlated with
validity.  That is, the more backward citations a patent has, the more
likely it is that it will be invalidated.4  This is directly contrary to the 
current view that such citations are an indicator of patent quality.5
 4. See Zhen Lei & Brian Wright, Why Weak Patents? Rational Ignorance or Pro­
’Customer’ Tilt? 3–4 (July 14, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1434275 [https://perma.cc/EZ5G-TDEZ?type=pdf] (suggesting 
that patent examiners work harder to find prior art to invalidate weaker patents and
providing evidence that more citations imply weaker patents). 
5. See, e.g., John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 453‒55
(2004) (finding backward citations significant); John Hagedoorn & Myriam Cloodt, 
Measuring Innovative Performance: Is There an Advantage in Using Multiple Indicators?,
32 RES. POL’Y 1365, 1365 (2003) (discussing backward citations as indicator of patent
quality); Maayan Perel, An Ex Ante Theory of Patent Valuation: Transforming Patent 
Quality into Patent Value, 14 J. HIGH TECH. L. 148, 202–13 (2014) (describing several 
objective measures of patent valuation); Manuel Trajtenberg, A Penny For Your Quotes:
Patent Citations and the Value of Innovations, 21 RAND J. ECON. 172, 172 (1990) (noting
that citations have long been presumed to be indicative of patent value); Manuel
Trajtenberg et al., University Versus Corporate Patents: A Window on the Basicness of 
Invention, in  PATENTS, CITATIONS & INNOVATIONS: A WINDOW ON THE KNOWLEDGE
ECONOMY 51, 60, 63 (Adam B. Jaffe & Manuel Trajtenberg eds., 2002) (including
backward citations in measures of patent quality); Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, 
The Quality of Ideas: Measuring Innovation with Multiple Indicators 10 (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7345, 1999), http://www.nber.org/papers/w7345
[http://perma.cc/G3T5-AVG9] (modeling value based on citations). But see John R. 
Allison, Mark A. Lemley & Joshua Walker, Patent Quality and Settlement Among Repeat 
Patent Litigants, 99 GEO. L.J. 677, 681, 686–87 (2011) [hereinafter Allison et al., Patent 
Quality] (finding that most litigated patents won less often, despite having more backward 
citations); Alan C. Marco, The Dynamics of Patent Citations, 94 ECON. LETTERS 290, 295 
(2007) (observing that citations may not fully encapsulate value); Lanjouw & 
Schankerman, supra, at 16 (finding that backward references did not affect the probability
that maintenance fees would be paid on the patent). 
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9.	 Noninfringement. Noninfringement may be a greater concern with
the highly litigious NPEs.  More than 66% of cases testing infringement 
involved a noninfringement finding, and only two cases—out of more 
than 870—found infringement.  Among the control group, 27% of the 
cases found noninfringement, about the same percentage that found 
infringement. 
10. Magnitude, Revisited. The scope of the noninfringement problem is 
ambiguous.  Only 7.5% of all the NPE cases involved a noninfringement 
finding.6  More than 75% of the cases never involved a test of
infringement one way or the other.
These findings do not imply that all is right in patent litigation. The 
increasing number of lawsuits, increasing case complexity, and increasing
stakes are all important.  So-called patent trolls are at the center of this 
maelstrom, and they provoke a visceral reaction in many who read about 
them.  The goal of this study is to take a step back from rhetoric, consider
the data in a neutral way, and detail policy implications that arise. 
To provide this analysis, this Article fills two persistent gaps in the 
literature studying patents and patent litigation.  First, it provides long­
term trends involving the same patents in multiple cases rather than cross-
sectional snapshots examining the outcomes of a single year or a few
patents. Second, it examines the entirety of patent litigation in detail, 
rather than only those cases that result in a ruling on the merits of the case.
Study after study examines the results of patent litigation.  Most of these 
studies historically only looked at opinions available in research databases.7 
With a few exceptions, only recently have studies begun to look at 
6. In other words, that 66% was two-thirds of a small percentage of cases that 
tested infringement at all.
7. See, e.g., John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the 
Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 187 (1998) (using United States Patents
Quarterly (USPQ) reports); Alan C. Marco, The Selection Effects (and Lack Thereof) in 
Patent Litigation: Evidence From Trials, 4 TOPICS ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y 1, 5 (2004)
(using USPQ); Matthew D. Henry et al., Dynamics of Patent Precedent and Enforcement: 
An Introduction to the UGA Patent Litigation Datafile (Mar. 4, 2013) (unpublished 
manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2228103 [http://perma.cc/
835C-RKNP] (describing a data set built to analyze patent litigation in the United States 
during 1929–2006 using USPQ). But see Paul M. Janicke & LiLan Ren, Who Wins Patent
Infringement Cases?, 34 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 7 (2006) (studying only patent cases that reached
a final disposition on the merits and were reviewed by the Federal Circuit); Jean O. Lanjouw
& Mark Schankerman, Protecting Intellectual Property Rights: Are Small Firms
Handicapped?, 47 J.L. & ECON. 45, 57 (2004) (using docket data but only at a coarse level). 
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orders—when judges rule on patents in unpublished rulings.8  A few 
studies examine what happens when judges do not rule, counting settlements, 
denials of summary judgment, and the like.9  But gathering quality data is 
time consuming and error prone, and until 2001, was nearly impossible. 
Thus, every study faces a tradeoff between detail and breadth.10 As a 
result, longitudinal surveys in the literature often lack detail.11  Conversely, 
detailed outcome studies often cover a small sample, limited by time and
to cases that actually reached some judicial ruling one way or the other.12 
Limiting detailed samples this way causes two problems.  First, it can lead
 8. See, e.g., John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & David L. Schwartz, 
Understanding the Realities of Modern Patent Litigation, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1769, 1769 
(2014) [hereinafter Allison et al., Realities of Patent Litigation]; Jay P. Kesan & 
Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases Resolved? An Empirical Examination of the 
Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 237, 258 (2006);
Gwendolyn G. Ball & Jay P. Kesan, Transaction Costs and Trolls: Strategic Behavior by
Individual Inventors, Small Firms and Entrepreneurs in Patent Litigation 14 (Ill. Law & 
Econ. Papers Series, Research Papers Series No. LE09-005, 2009), http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1337166 [https://perma.cc/ D9WV-S42J?type=pdf].
9. See, e.g., Allison et al., Patent Quality, supra note 5, at 686 (evaluating patent
cases resolved by settlements, including consent judgments); Robin Feldman et al., The
AIA 500 Expanded: The Effects of Patent Monetization Entities, UCLA J.L. & TECH. 59– 
62 (Dec. 31, 2013), http://www.lawtechjournal.com/articles/2013/041024-Feldman.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/EJL6-WL5Y] (summarizing outcomes of patent cases that settled and 
those that were decided at summary judgment or trial); Kesan & Ball, supra note 8, at 258 
(studying docket reports and determining how patent disputes are resolved); Ball & Kesan, 
supra note 8, at 9–10 (same). 
10. See Kesan & Ball, supra note 8, at 259. 
11. See, e.g., CHRIS BARRY ET AL., PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2014 PATENT
LITIGATION STUDY: AS CASE VOLUME LEAPS, DAMAGES CONTINUE GENERAL DECLINE 1 
(2014) [hereinafter PWC 2014], http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/forensic-services/publications/
assets/2014-patent-litigation-study.pdf [http://perma.cc/T3DG-FJ59] (providing general 
observations from final decisions at summary judgment and trial recorded in two Westlaw 
databases); CHRIS BARRY ET AL., PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2013 PATENT LITIGATION
STUDY: BIG CASES MAKE HEADLINES, WHILE PATENT CASES PROLIFERATE (2013)
[hereinafter PWC 2013], http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/forensic-services/publications/
assets/2013-patent-litigation-study.pdf [http://perma.cc/M4KU-TLED] (same); Feldman
et al., supra note 9 (coding all patent litigation for four years by end result but not by
patent); Lanjouw & Schankerman, supra note 7, at 49–50 (noting that granular litigation 
data was unavailable); Michael J. Mazzeo et al., Do NPEs Matter? Non-Practicing Entities 
and Patent Litigation Outcomes, 9 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 879 (2013) (examining only
judge and jury trial outcomes in U.S. district courts); Shawn P. Miller, Where’s the
Innovation: An Analysis of the Quantity and Qualities of Anticipated and Obvious Patents, 
18 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2013) (considering only obviousness and anticipation decisions);
Henry et al., supra note 7 (manuscript at 3) (focusing only on published opinions). 
12. Allison et al., Patent Quality, supra note 5, at 682 (considering only the most 
litigated patents); Allison et al., Realities of Patent Litigation, supra note 8, at 1778
(considering two years only and merits decisions only); Christopher A. Cotropia et al., 
Unpacking Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs), 99 MINN L. REV. 649, 662–66 (2014) 
(considering two years of litigation and for plaintiff status only).
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to a sample too small to statistically test theories about patent quality. 
Second, it leads to potential explanatory data loss by leaving out patent 
and outcome information from cases that end without a judge ever passing 
on the merits.  Even those studies that consider cases that never reach a
merits ruling only do so for a few years or a few patents. 
The data collected in this Article attempts to bridge the gap by providing
detail and longevity.  Rather than considering a short sample of judicial
rulings, it opts instead to consider a large sample of lawsuits over a twenty-
five year period to determine what happened in every case associated with a
set of patents through appeal, whether a court ruled on the merits or not.
This twenty-five year history of litigation allows for an unprecedented
comparison between highly litigious NPEs and other patent litigants. 
While prior studies, including my own, helpfully examine pieces of the 
puzzle, this Article seeks a glimpse at the entire picture. 
Thus, this Article builds on the very best parts of current cross-sectional 
work13 by adding a longitudinal component that finds every case that 
asserted a set of patents and then separately tracing the outcome of every
patent asserted in each of those cases. 
Part II discusses the debate about patent troll litigation.  It focuses on 
how other studies have measured patent quality through patent litigation 
data. 
Part III discusses this study’s methodology: the collection of data about
highly litigious NPEs and a control group of randomly selected nonNPEs. 
It describes how the cases were selected and the data collected in different
phases of the study.  This includes collection of previously untapped data: 
reexamination outcomes.
Part IV presents the data in a variety of formats, and follows each
subpart with a discussion of potential policy implications associated with 
the data. 
Subpart IV.A shows the growth in case complexity, including defendant
counts, transfers and consolidations, and selection of district court venue.
This subpart includes a linear regression showing the effect of NPEs on 
case duration. 
Subpart IV.B shows how much more often the NPEs settled and all of 
the different ways that cases ended.  For example, NonNPEs ended a large 
13. Allison et al., Realities of Patent Litigation, supra note 8, at 1778 (examining
every case from 2008 and 2009, including denials of summary judgment). 
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portion of their cases with consent judgments, though the NPEs used
consent judgments as well. 
Subpart IV.C presents data about invalidity in a number of ways: in 
terms of adjudicated patents, all patents, and cases.  This subpart presents
a novel regression estimating the likelihood that an asserted patent will be 
invalidated and finds that NPE status is not among the factors. 
Subpart IV.D examines infringement findings and shows that the 
primary concern with NPEs may be noninfringement rather than invalidity.
Both subparts C and D show that decisions on the merits of cases are so
rare that it is difficult to base policies on them.
This Article concludes with some thoughts about how the results might 
guide policy.
II. BACKGROUND
The costs and, for some, benefits of patent litigation have captured the
public’s attention in a way that few could have predicted only four years 
ago. News stories have shifted from President Obama having famous 
patented devices in his office14 to President Obama decrying the cost of 
frivolous litigation both in town hall meetings15 and even in the State of 
the Union address.16 
As a result, the pressure to study patent litigation has grown, and the
production of these studies has been aided by great improvement in patent 
litigation docket data, which allows access not only to cases filed but also 
to each document filed in recent cases.17
 14. See Nancy Benac, Obama Oval Office Gets an Updated Look, HUFFINGTON
POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/01/07/obama-oval-office-gets-an_n_411365.html
[http://perma.cc/WV7J-CYH2] (last updated May 25, 2011, 3:05 PM) (“Also new to the 
Obama bookshelves are three mechanical devices on loan from the National Museum of
American History’s patent collection: models for Samuel Morse’s 1849 telegraph register, 
John Peer’s 1874 gear-cutting machine and Henry Williams’ 1877 feathering paddlewheel
for steamboats.”). 
15. Ali Sternburg, Obama Acknowledges Patent Troll Problem, PAT. PROGRESS
(Feb. 14, 2013), http://www.patentprogress.org/2013/02/14/obama-acknowledges-patent­
troll-problem-w-transcript [http://perma.cc/A2V6-FXXA] (describing a Google Hangout 
discussion: “I do think that our efforts at patent reform only went about halfway to where 
we need to go and what we need to do is pull together additional stakeholders and see if
we can build some additional consensus on smarter patent laws”). 
16. Erin Mershon, Obama Backs Patent Reform Effort in State of the Union, 
POLITICO (Jan. 28, 2014, 9:22 PM), http://www.politico.com/blogs/politico-live/2014/ 
01/obama-backs-patent-reform-effort-in-state-of-the-union-182139.html. 
17. Bloomberg’s docket search functions provide every electronically available 
federal filing to subscribers—not just docket entries but also the underlying document.
Services such as Docket Navigator, Lex Machina, Patent Freedom (now purchased by
RPX), and RPX have improved their coverage with varying degrees of public accessibility.
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Data is so available that studies of litigation behavior have almost
become a cottage industry.18  Some of the studies provide rallying cries 
for reform,19 some present different conclusions from essentially the same
data,20 and some argue that there is no real problem.21  Each of these
studies has some role to play in the formation of public policy.
Some studies have looked at NPE litigation.  Many studies have 
examined the number of NPE suits in comparison with patent litigation 
generally, and the nearly uniform findings indicate that NPE filings have 
grown in recent years.22  As late as 2009, the evidence showed NPEs filing 
18. Docket Navigator, Lex Machina, Patent Freedom, and RPX all provide litigation
data services.  Lex Machina, PricewaterhouseCoopers, and RPX all issue annual litigation
reports.
19. See, e.g., COLLEEN CHIEN, NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION, PATENT ASSERTION AND
STARTUP INNOVATION 4–5 (2013), http://oti.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/
policydocs/Patent%20Assertion%20and%20Startup%20Innovation_updated.pdf [http://perma. 
cc/EC3K-3MNG] (recommending several interventions to ameliorate the harms of patent 
assertion on small companies, keeping in mind the special needs of startups who, with 
their fewer resources, less time, and greater focus on building the business, are at a relative
disadvantage when patent processes are expensive, slow, or require deep patent expertise); 
James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99 CORNELL L.
REV. 387, 407–12 (2014) (estimating the direct costs to defendants arising from NPE
patent assertions); Colleen Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, STAN. TECH. L. REV. 462, 
464 (May 19, 2014), https://journals.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/stanford-technology-law­
review/online/startupsandpatenttrolls.pdf [https://perma.cc/UT98-ARRD] (finding most
unique defendants to troll suits are small and presenting data that suggest a number of
reforms put in place over the last year are having a positive impact); Catherine Tucker,
The Effect of Patent Litigation and Patent Assertion Entities on Entrepreneurial Activity
2 (MIT Sloan Sch. of Mgmt., Working Paper No. 5095-14, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2457611 [http://perma.cc/MK8H-DLM8] (investigating the 
statistical relation between levels of patent litigation and venture capital investment in the 
United States).
20. Cf. Cotropia et al., supra note 12, at 692–96 (comparing different results from 
three studies).
21. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-465, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: 
ASSESSING FACTORS THAT AFFECT PATENT INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION COULD HELP
IMPROVE PATENT QUALITY 17 (2013) [hereinafter GAO] (finding only slight increase in 
patent monetization entity lawsuits between 2007 and 2011); Steve Moore & Kelley Drye, 
Probing 10 Patent Troll Myths—A Factured Fairytale Part 2, IPWATCHDOG (July 30, 
2013), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/07/30/probing-10-patent-troll-myths-a-factured-fairy
tale-part-2/id=43754 [http://perma.cc/VWF6-AFVD] (finding few differences between
NPEs and nonNPEs).
22. See, e.g., Cotropia et al., supra note 12, at 674; Sara Jeruss, Robin Feldman & 
Joshua Walker, The America Invents Act 500: Effects of Patent Monetization Entities on
U.S. Litigation, DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 388 (Nov. 30, 2012), http://scholarship.law.
duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1239&context=dltr [http://perma.cc/5YTP-RZHK].
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only a small fraction of all patent infringement suits,23 though many highly
litigated patents are owned by NPEs.24  But since then, NPE lawsuits have
grown to more than half of filings, depending on how one defines an
NPE.25 
Other studies have examined the quality of patents owned by trolls, but
either they are noncomprehensive26 or they focus only on merits rulings.27 
Finally, a few studies have examined NPE case outcomes not on the 
merits. One study found that licensing companies are more likely to settle 
cases than other small entities.28  Another study considered the outcome 
of cases over a six-year period but did not track consolidated cases,
appeals, or specific patents.29  A study of highly litigated patents found a
90% settlement rate among the most litigated patents.30  This follows a 
theory that NPEs are most successful when they do not reach a jury 
verdict.31 
But each study suffers from some particular drawbacks.  First, they are 
virtually all cross-sectional, looking at a year or two—sometimes four or 
23. See Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and
Evidence in the Litigation of High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1571, 1572 (2009)
(finding NPEs bring 17% of high-tech patent suits in eight years); Ball & Kesan, supra
note 8, at 25 (noting that a small percentage of patent plaintiffs are licensing companies); 
Axel Haus & Steffen Juranek, Patent Trolls, Litigation, and the Market for Innovation 8–
9 (May 15, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2424407
[http://perma.cc/F67V-N7YT] (indicating a random sample of litigation between 2004 and 
2007 showed only 12% of cases as NPEs); see also David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan,
Analyzing the Role of Non-Practicing Entities in the Patent System, 99 CORNELL L. REV.
425, 440–41 (2014) (highlighting debates about what constitutes an NPE). 
24. See John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & Joshua Walker, Extreme Value or
Trolls on Top? The Characteristics of the Most-Litigated Patents, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 
24–25 (2009) [hereinafter Allison et al., Most-Litigated Patents] (showing that 
approximately half of the most litigated patents are enforced by NPEs). 
25. See Cotropia et al., supra note 12, at 652, 655, 674. 
26. See Sannu K. Shrestha, Note, Trolls or Market-Makers? An Empirical Analysis
of Nonpracticing Entities, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 114, 119–31 (2010) (examining a small 
high-profile set of cases).
27. See PwC 2014, supra note 11 (examining only win rates); PwC 2013, supra
note 11 (same); Jonathan H. Ashtor et al., Patents at Issue: The Data Behind the Patent 
Troll Debate, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 957 (2014) (studying merits rulings only); Miller,
supra note 11 (examining only obviousness and anticipation rulings). 
28. Ball & Kesan, supra note 8, at 20; see also Ashtor et al., supra note 27, at 959 
(interpreting data to mean NPEs could be more likely to settle than other patent plaintiffs); 
Haus & Juranek, supra note 23 (manuscript at 2) (finding NPE cases resolve faster). 
29. Feldman et al., supra note 9, at 61. 
30.  Allison et al., Patent Quality, supra note 5, at 689. 
31. See Gerard N. Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the 
Perils of Innovation, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1809, 1813 (2007) (“[S]ince trolls and 
sharks succeed as long as they reach settlements, a substantive solution will be ineffective
because most of these cases never get to court.”).
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five—of patent litigation but never tracing the same patents throughout
their lives. This is helpful for some purposes but not helpful to determine
whether current observations are different from long-term trends.  Second, 
many of them lack a control group; they present data for one type of group 
without showing that the results differ from the other groups.
Cross-sectional data without a control group significantly detracts from 
the ability of a study to inform policy.32  This study provides longitudinal
data. It also provides a control group.33 These two improvements alone
should aid policy.
III. METHODOLOGY AND DATA COLLECTION
A goal of this study was to compare evidence about litigation by patent 
plaintiffs with the evidence previously gathered about NPEs.  Thus, the 
study collected data from the same basic sources as those described in 
Patent Troll Myths; those sources are summarized below.34 
A. Selecting the NPEs 
The study begins with the ten most litigious NPEs of the 2000s.35  Some 
of these entities are still the most litigious, but many are not.36  These
particular NPEs are worth studying for several reasons.  First, as the most
litigious entities, they likely impose the greatest social cost in litigation 
defense and otherwise.37  Second, their cases are more likely to be
completed than more recent litigious NPEs.  Third, at least two of the
 32. See Gerald H. Kramer, The Ecological Fallacy Revisited: Aggregate- versus 
Individual-Level Findings on Economics and Elections, and Sociotropic Voting, 77 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 92, 93 (1983) (mounting influential critique of cross-sectional studies of 
behavior).
33. Cf. Haus & Juranek, supra note 23 (manuscript at 8) (criticizing another study
for lacking a control group). 
34. However, data sources have improved somewhat since 2010, and a collection 
of detailed case outcome information revealed some erroneous or duplicative data from 
the prior article.  Thus, some of the data here will not identically match the results from 
Patent Troll Myths, though the differences are minor. 
35. More accurately, these are the plaintiffs that filed the most lawsuits between 
2003 and 2009, though we gathered their cases for all years. 
36. These include Acacia Research, Catch Curve, Cygnus Systems, F&G Research, 
General Patent Corporation, Millenium, Papst Licensing, Plutus IP (now IPNav), Rates
Technology, and Ronald A. Katz Technology Licensing.
37. See Risch, supra note 3, at 467–68. 
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NPEs, Acacia and Plutus—now IPNav—continue to be active and highly 
litigious. 
Fourth, there is no reason to believe that the patents themselves are
unrepresentative of NPE patents generally,38 though admittedly this is not
proven statistically.  The NPEs in this study represent a mix of business
types, including aggregators, inventor-owned companies, and privateering,39 
and thus obtain their patents from the same sources as other NPEs.  Further,
these very patent plaintiffs are the objects of derision in articles about
patent trolls.40 
Fifth, if they are unrepresentative, then the bias likely runs against NPEs 
in general rather than in favor of them—at least among those NPEs that 
file lawsuits.41  Many companies classified as NPEs are design houses or 
38. See Michael Risch, A Patent Behemoth Rears Its Head, MADISONIAN (Dec. 8,
2010), http://madisonian.net/2010/12/08/a-patent-behemoth-rears-its-head [http://perma.cc/
B25E-777F] (arguing that Intellectual Ventures’ patents have characteristics similar to the
patents in this study, such as the fact that they are coming from individual inventors,
startups, and large corporations). 
39.  Privateers enforce practicing company patents.
40. See, e.g., Preston H. Heard, Georgia Federal Court Does Not Require Internal 
Communications of Outside Counsel To Be Listed On Privilege Log, NAT’L L. REV. (Feb. 
7, 2014), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/georgia-federal-court-does-not-require­
internal-communications-outside-counsel-to-be [http://perma.cc/VM4T-WU35] (discussing 
sham litigation allegation against Catch Curve); David Segal, Has Patent. Will Sue., N.Y.
TIMES, July 14, 2013, at BU1, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/business/has-patent­
will-sue-an-alert-to-corporate-america.html [http://perma.cc/2HJZ-HZC5] (profiling of
Erich Spangenberg and IPNav); Paul Belleflamme, What To Think of ‘Patent Trolls’? The 
Return, IPDIGIT (Oct. 31, 2011), http://www.ipdigit.eu/2011/10/what-to-think-of-patent­
trolls-the-return [http://perma.cc/2AHE-Y9TR] (debating merits of General Patent 
Corporation as a troll); Joe Mullin, Rackspace Sues “Most Notorious Patent Troll in
America,”  ARS TECHNICA (Apr. 4, 2013, 8:15 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/
2013/04/rackspace-sues-most-notorious-patent-troll-in-america [http://perma.cc/5EZ3­
CWE7] (claiming wrongful assertion by IPNav); Rik Myslewski, Survey: Patent
Litigation Skyrocketing, Trolls Top 10 Sueball Chuckers, REGISTER (May 13, 2014, 8:33 
PM), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/05/13/survey_patent_litigation_skyrocketing_trolls_t
op_10_sueball_chuckers [http://perma.cc/7R6B-PFBC] (showing Ronald A. Katz
Technology Licensing in top ten list for most patents involved in lawsuits); Bill Rigby, 
Microsoft Sues Acacia Over Smartphone Patents, REUTERS (Nov. 20, 2013, 2:50 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/20/us-microsoft-patents-idUSBRE9AJ14X20131120 
[http://perma.cc/C7EU-FFFJ] (quoting industry lawyer: “Acacia’s lawsuits are the worst 
kind of abusive litigation behavior, attempting to extract payment based on litigation 
tactics and not the value of its patents.”). 
41. While there may be NPEs with a few weak patents under fire for sending
abusive settlement demands without intending to file suit, no litigation study would 
capture their activities. See, e.g., Press Release, Office of the Minnesota Attorney General 
Lori Swanson, Attorney General Lori Swanson Announces First-in-the-Nation Order To 
Stop Delaware Company from “Patent Trolling” in Minnesota (Aug. 20, 2013), 
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Panel_17b_Documents.pdf [http://perma.cc/B9E3-LVE2]; 
Joe Mullin, Patent Stunner: Under Attack, Nation’s Most Notorious “Troll” Sues Federal 
Gov’t, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 14, 2014, 6:44 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/ 
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assert just a few patents, such that the likelihood of complex mass
litigation is unlikely.42  Furthermore, as will be seen below, NPEs in 
general are far more successful in litigation than the NPEs studied here.43 
If these highly litigious plaintiffs lose more often than other NPEs, then 
the quality differences found here may be smaller among the general 
patent assertion population.  In other words, if these NPEs are not 
representative, they are biased in a way that implies more patents, weaker 
patents, more cost, and more litigation. If it exists, such bias is preferable
for policymaking over assuming every other NPE holds better patents than 
these NPEs. These cases are, after all, a large portion of the docket. 
But that is the worst-case scenario.  It is unclear that the patents in this
study are unrepresentative.  For example, individual plaintiffs have a
much lower win rate than other NPEs,44 and many of the NPEs in this 
study are inventor-owned companies that might also have lower win rates. 
Further, if there are differences from the general NPE population, those 
differences may manifest themselves in different ways.  For example, the
patents in this study may have the same quality, but they may be asserted
against noninfringing products.45  Or the patents and cases may be of the
01/patent-stunner-under-attack-nations-most-notorious-troll-sues-federal-govt [http://perma.cc/
LD9Q-YXWM] (noting if the FTC sues MPHJ Technology Investments, it will be the first 
time the FTC has taken direct legal action against a patent assertion entity); Julie Samuels,
MPHJ Exposed: The Real Dirt on the Notorious Scanner Troll, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUND. (Jan. 14, 2014), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/01/mphj-exposed-the-real­
dirt-notorious-scanner-troll [https://perma.cc/M4TG-LLK9] (discussing demand letters
sent by MPHJ Technology Investments); Martyn Williams, Patent Troll MPHJ Will Repay 
All New York Licenses in Settlement with State, PC WORLD (Jan. 14, 2014, 8:35 AM), 
http://www.pcworld.com/article/2087720/patent-troll-mphj-will-repay-all-new-york-licensees
-in-settlement-with-state.html [http://perma.cc/HF69-JADG] (discussing that the MPHJ 
Technology Investments settlement should serve as a warning to other patent owners 
engaged in similar practices).
42. See Cotropia et al., supra note 12, at 650 (describing different business models 
for NPEs); Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 
113 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2127–28 (2013) (discussing the implications of different 
assertion business models); Colleen Chien, Patent Trolls by the Numbers (Santa Clara
Univ. Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 08-13, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=2233041 [http://perma.cc/8CMF-E69E] (describing different “trolls” to
include a variety of business models). 
43. See PwC 2014, supra note 11, at 10 (finding that NPEs win 25% of cases
decided on the merits, including 65% of their cases at trial).
44. See, e.g., PwC 2014, supra note 11, at 20. 
45. Cf. Allison et al., Realities of Patent Litigation, supra note 8, at 1778 (finding
more cases determined on noninfringement than invalidity). 
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same general quality but simply have been asserted more times, and thus
they may be more likely to be unsuccessful.46 
From this discussion it bears noting, though, that throughout this paper 
the term NPE is used generally to refer to these ten NPEs. How much and 
how to extrapolate the data to the general population is a more complex
question.
B. Selecting a Loosely Matched Random Control Set
The control group consists of a randomly selected set of asserted patents 
and the cases in which they were asserted. These patent owners and cases
are not necessarily highly litigious. 
1. Choosing “Normal” Cases 
If data about the most litigious NPEs might be biased, this raises an
alternative question: why not compare them against the most litigious 
practicing entities?  It turns out that some of the most litigious practicing 
entities, such as Monsanto, are in the matched set, but some are not. There 
are three reasons not to select only highly litigious nonNPEs. 
First, and most practically, the most litigious practicing entities assert
many fewer patents47 and thus are not likely to generate a comparable set 
of patents or even litigations to consider. 
Second, a primary goal of this study is to compare NPE litigation to the 
“average” litigation.  Selecting highly litigious practicing entities will not 
achieve this goal. It might answer other questions, such as whether the
most litigious NPEs behave differently than the most litigious nonNPEs,48 
but it will not help determine whether these NPEs are different in kind 
from the usual case.  This is why the potential bias of using the most
litigious NPEs is not problematic; however the most litigious NPEs 
compare with the average nonNPE, the average nonlitigious NPE will 
compare the same or better.
Third, and more technically, to the extent that the most litigious
practicing entities hold patents in a few technology classes—as one might
expect from a product company—it becomes impossible to compare 
46. Infra Part IV.C finds that more assertion leads to a higher likelihood of
invalidity.  Allison, Lemley & Walker found that more assertion led to more losses. See
Allison et al., Patent Quality, supra note 5, at 688. 
47. Monsanto, for example, filed 116 cases using the same patent and included 13 
other patents in a few of the cases—at most 35—for two of its patents. 
48. For studies of highly litigated patents, which is a similar question, see Allison 
et al., Most-Litigated Patents, supra note 24, and Allison et al., Patent Quality, supra note 
5. 
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whether NPEs assert patents in similar classes to random practicing
entities. The same concern does not necessarily run the other direction 
because many of the studied NPEs have an incentive to obtain diversified
portfolios. This same justification applies more generally to other
comparisons, such as original patent assignees; NPEs obtain patents from 
a variety of sources, whereas the most litigious practicing entities likely
obtain theirs from only a few. 
2. Selecting the Cases
The studied NPEs were involved in more than 900 cases associated with
about 350 patents.  The goal was to find a random set of nonNPE cases 
distributed over the same time period—a matching set.  Because we49 had
patent data and litigation data, we had two primary choices for selecting 
this random control sample: choosing cases from the same time periods 
or choosing patents from the same time periods. 
We used a hybrid matching solution that used information about both
the patents and the cases.  We began with the number of patents and 
identified 350 random cases distributed by year in the same proportions 
as NPE litigation. We did not match patents, though; instead, we took the 
number of patents as our initial draw of random cases. 
After identifying 350 nonNPE cases distributed proportionally during 
the same years as our NPE litigation, we identified the patents asserted in 
those cases.  We then found every case asserting those patents regardless 
of year filed and also logged the patents asserted in those cases.  We only
dug one level deep; we did not seek to find all of the cases asserting each
new patent identified in later cases.  This will likely bias the tally of how 
many times each patent was asserted because many of our nonNPE
patents are truncated at one.  However, the bias is likely negligible 
because the median even among NPEs is only two cases per patent. 
The end result of the matching is a set of 1311 patent cases involving 
791 patents.  Table 1 shows the difference between the two sets; the 
percentage distributions are roughly equal—close enough to avoid a bias 
associated with too much emphasis on early years—but the differences
are statistically significant.50  The drop in cases by NPEs in 2009 implies
that many of the individual inventor NPEs were winding down activities, 
49. The use of “we” throughout refers to the Author, research assistants, and data 
coders. Final decisions about methodology and data collection were the Author’s alone. 
50.  p=0.000 in a chi-squared test. 
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perhaps as their patents expired.  Table 1 lists the number of cases filed 
each year, along with the mean, standard deviation, and median number
of defendants in each case.51  The table shows that—for these NPEs— 
2006 and 2007 were the most active years, with about 30% of all the cases 
filed in just those two years.  The table also shows the steady growth in 
the number of defendants filed in each case, both for NPEs and nonNPEs.
In the 1990s, approximately 1.5 defendants per case was the norm, but
that grew as high as four or five defendants per case.  However, the
medians were lower—one or two—and standard deviations were high, 
implying skewed data resulting in a few cases with many defendants 
driving the averages.
TABLE 1 
51. Some data for the NPEs will not exactly match the data in Patent Troll Myths; 
new and improved docket access tools coupled with better data deduplication associated 
with determining case outcome resulted in some changed case counts.  The changes were
not biased in any direction.  For example, the prior set included some consolidated cases; 
tracing the individual cases back to the original filings both (a) increased the number of
cases, and (b) changed the date the litigation commenced.  However, there were also cases 
that had both the original and the transferred cases listed.  Removing the transferred case
left the litigation initiation the same but decreased the number of cases.
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The selected cases are representative of the types of plaintiffs in the 
general population.  Table 2 compares the plaintiff types for both
nonNPEs and NPEs with similar categories for the population of all patent 
plaintiffs in 2010, a year later.52  It also includes a rough breakdown of
patent plaintiffs for all litigation from 2000 and 2002.53 
The table shows patent plaintiffs broken down by category, according 
to the Lemley-Myhrvold categorization of patent owners.54  The first 
group compares the makeup of plaintiff types in this study with all 
plaintiff types in 2010 and also in 2000 and 2002.  The percentages are 
based only on the NPE and nonNPE category types, with overlap for
individuals.55 
TABLE 2 
As compared to 2010, this study slightly oversamples product
companies and undersamples individual plaintiffs and inventor-owned 
companies.  This is an acceptable tradeoff, given scholarship that favors
product companies as a plaintiff class.  Among the NPE samples, this 
52. The 2010 data was compiled by Christopher Cotropia, Jay P. Kesan, and David
L. Schwartz and is available for download at http://npedata.com [http://perma.cc/43CX­
PWP6].  See Cotropia et al., supra note 12, for an analysis of the data. 
53. See Ball & Kesan, supra note 8, at 31, for a summary of the 2000 and 2002 
data.  The 2000 and 2002 counts are not as granular, such that individuals and individual-
owned companies are not distinguished from small companies, and no NPEs other than 
licensing entities were tracked.
54. See Allison et al., Most-Litigated Patents, supra note 24, at 10. 
55. Unfortunately, most studies do not gather data on every single case, making it 
difficult to compare this sample with other measures.
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study undersamples licensing companies and oversamples inventor-
owned companies.  The difference is primarily explained by two factors. 
First, about 5% of the 2010 NPE cases were filed by ArrivalStar, which is 
likely an inventor-owned company,56 but were coded by Christopher
Cotropia, Jay Kesan, and David Schwartz as a licensing entity.57  Second,
it may reflect a historical change away from individual firms to licensing 
entities, given that the plaintiffs studied here were active from 1985 to
2009. For example, when limited to just 2008 and 2009, the cases in this 
study were 68% in Category 1 (licensing) and 24% in Category 5
(inventor-owned), which is much closer to the 2010 distribution for the
entire population.  Of course, there is also likely to be some random 
variation from year to year.  As compared with 2000 and 2002, this study
undersamples individuals.  This is not surprising in longitudinal data, as 
individuals have been a decreasing proportion of plaintiffs over time.
As discussed further below, several case outcome measures are generally 
similar to those of cross-sectional studies.58 
Further, comparisons of technology types also imply a representative 
sample.  A comparison of the nonNPEs in this study with earlier cross-
sectional studies of all litigation shows representative similarities and 
cross-sectional differences. Table 3 shows the broad National Bureau of 
Economic Research (NBER) technology classification59 profiles for four
groups of patents: Valuable Patents,60 which covers all cases that terminated 
in 1999 and 2000; Ball & Kesan,61 which covers all nonlicensing entity 
cases initiated in 2000 and 2002; this study, which covers all nonNPE patents;
and this study, but limited to only nonNPE patents in cases terminating in 
1999 and 2000. The NBER classifications are rough but suitable to
broadly show representative sampling. 
56. See Paul Brinkmann, Delray Beach Inventor Files Hundreds of Patent Suits 
Nationwide, S. FLA. BUS. J. (Jan. 25, 2013, 6:00 AM), http://www.bizjournals.com/ 
southflorida/print-edition/2013/01/25/delray-beach-inventor-files-hundreds.html [http://perma. 
cc/B97B-2G98] (“Hundreds of patent lawsuits . . . lead back to one South Florida-based
inventor, Martin Kelly Jones, and a company associated with him, ArrivalStar S.A.”).
57. See supra note 52. 
58. See, e.g., supra note 57. 
59. Bronwyn H. Hall et al., The NBER Patent-Citations Data File: Lessons, 
Insights, and Methodological Tools, in PATENTS, CITATIONS & INNOVATIONS, supra note
4, at 403, 415. 
60.  Allison et al., Valuable Patents, supra note 5, at 472 (showing classification of
all patents whose litigation terminated in 1999 and 2000). 
61.  Ball & Kesan, supra note 8, at 37.
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TABLE 3 
The comparison shows that the cross-sectional sample from this study 
and the others is relatively close, with a slight shift between electronics 
and computers.  This full longitudinal sample from this study also shows 
a similar profile but with a shift from “others” to electronics and 
computers.  This is to be expected, given that most of the cases in this
study were filed about ten years after the cross-section and thus were more 
likely to involve more high technology patents, even among nonNPEs. 
3. Using a Hybrid Solution 
The hybrid-matching algorithm is a bit unusual; most studies either
match by case or by patent.  These usual solutions leave much to be 
desired for a sample of all litigation relating to particular patents asserted
by a representative sample of litigants.62 
Picking a proportional number of cases filed in a given year appears
preferable because the goal of the study is to compare patents and litigation
outcomes, and those might be dependent on the year.  For example, choosing 
a disproportionate number of cases from 1989—when there were few 
NPE cases—would yield a biased match in testing whether a particular
technology was asserted at the same rates; a group with too many early 
patents would appear to have much more technology from the 1980s.  It 
62. See generally Allison et al., Most-Litigated Patents, supra note 24 (considering 
the 106 most litigated patents and comparing them to 106 random patents, but not 
comparing litigation results to those random patents); Allison et al., Patent Quality, supra
note 5 (same).
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would be better to match the rate of case filings by year and then compare 
technologies between groups. 
But strict case proportionality has its own problems.  Selecting 900 
random cases distributed between 1985 and 2009 is also inappropriate. 
Although the control set would be random, it would include only one case 
per patent and ignore all other cases in which the patent might be asserted.
Limiting cases to one per patent would neither reflect the realities of 
patent litigation nor provide an adequate comparison for repeat assertion, 
an important aspect of patent litigation. The random set must contain as
many cases asserting a patent as can be found. 
Matching on 350 patents and then finding the cases in which they were
asserted would also be insufficient.  The preferred criteria to match would
be the earliest priority date, the grant date, or maybe the application date. 
But each of these would also be divorced from the date of litigation
because patents are often held for years and asserted in lawsuits at highly 
varying ages.63  Indeed, measuring the age of patents in litigation is a goal
of this study,64 so matching patents by age would not allow for a
comparison. 
Thus, the hybrid method, which begins with cases distributed by year
but then also finds all the other litigation associated with the patents in 
those cases, is a useful compromise to glean full knowledge from the data.
4. NPEs in the Matching Set 
With some exceptions discussed below, litigation by any NPE plaintiff, 
including those studied here, was discarded from the random cases 
identified.65  Because individuals have always made up a measurable portion 
of patent plaintiffs,66 we retained individual inventors67 and individual-
inventor companies.68 
We also retained three companies that may be controversial.  First, we 
retained Network Signatures.  This company might be controversial 
63. Cf. Miller, supra note 11, at 21–28 (matching patents to estimate likelihood that 
a random patent would be adjudicated but also counting other assertions of the patents). 
64.  This will be discussed in a later article.
65.  Not surprisingly, this became more common for later litigation years.
66. See Ball & Kesan, supra note 8, at 31; Cotropia et al., supra note 12, at 667. 
67. A couple of patents wound up in both sets: first asserted by an individual, then
assigned to Nike, and finally asserted by Plutus/IPNav.  Cases like these are a key reason 
why individuals were not excluded—there is often a fine line between the individual and
the manufacturer.
68. For example, we retained Barry J. Fiala, Inc., which also appears to have been
a practicing entity at the time of litigation.
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because both RPX69 and Jeruss et al.70 list it as one of their top ten most
litigious NPEs for a particular year.  Network Signatures may well be an 
NPE now, but at the time of its first lawsuits that are part of our study it
was providing a service.  Archived versions of its website show that it 
offered a beta test of a virtual private networking portal,71 released an
iPhone app,72 and hired a public relations firm to aid it in selling services 
to business customers.73  Other researchers examining the evidence 
independently came to the same conclusion.74  There were no rulings on
the merits in any of these cases.
Second, we encountered U.S. Ethernet Innovations, an LLC that 
enforces 3Com’s patents.  The difficulty is that 3Com asserted these very
same patents earlier, and quite successfully.  We included all patents and
outcomes originally assigned to 3Com but excluded patents issued 
directly to US Ethernet Innovations on the theory that ownership by an
NPE might somehow change the characteristics and assertion of such
patents. There was only one case in the sample brought directly by U.S. 
Ethernet Innovations, which involved four patents and no judgment on the 
merits.
Third, Card Activation Technologies actively asserted a single patent
assigned to it and had no other business.  However, we treated this plaintiff
as a licensing arm of a public company.  MedCom USA, a product 
company, acquired the patent through the acquisition of the original 
assignee, another product company, and then spun out Card Activation
 69. RPX CORP., 2012 NPE ACTIVITY REPORT 30 (2013), http://patentlyo.com/media/
docs/2013/07/0BF995E82CFF591EE80EFE8AC69259E7.pdf [http://perma.cc/S2VQ-C2RU].
70.  Jeruss et al., supra note 22, at 382. 
71. See The Power of Secure Global Communications in Your Hand, NETWORK
SIGNATURES, https://web.archive.org/web/20080222024502/http://vpn.networksignatures.com 
[https://perma.cc/3VFH-9QYV ] (last visited Mar. 30, 2015). 
72. See Get Real Protection. Get NetSig., NETWORK SIGNATURES, https://web.
archive.org/web/20110208005402/http://vpn.networksignatures.com [https://perma.cc/LJK8- 
5J6V] (last visited Mar. 30, 2015). 
73. See Network Signatures Retains CrowdGather for Online Marketing, BUS.
WIRE (Aug. 17, 2009, 8:00 AM), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/2009081700 
5283/en/Network-Signatures-Retains-CrowdGather-Online-Marketing#.VNgIpULP704 [https:// 
perma.cc/GB28-WHAJ?type=pdf]. 
74. See Christopher Cotropia et al., 2010 Patent Holder and Litigation Dataset, 
http://www.npedata.com [http://perma.cc/43CX-PWP6] (last updated May 28, 2014). 
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Technologies to manage a single patent.75 When the patent was eventually 
invalidated, the company ceased operations.76  The regressions in this
Article were re-estimated with these parties excluded, and the results did 
not meaningfully change.
C. Litigation Identification and Data 
We identified litigations based on both entity name and patents 
asserted.77  Party name searching was impractical for finding other cases
in our matching set; there may have been many patents owned by a 
plaintiff that were not litigated, and there may have been other litigation 
by the same plaintiff that did not involve the patents from the original
case. When we searched, we identified cases by patent number only using 
Westlaw docket reports, Lex Machina, Federal Circuit appellate opinions,
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), Derwent/Litalert, Lexis 
databases of patent litigation notices,78 and even Google.  We found
mistakes and typos in many of the databases, and even in some of the 
source documents filed by the parties themselves. 
We also kept track of transferred cases to ensure there was no double 
counting.79  This differentiates this study from many other “patent count”
studies that do not do so or simply drop transferred cases.80 
The litigation data was coded to include case name, location, filing date, 
and number of parties.81  We also gathered data about duration and
outcomes of litigation.82  The outcome data included the status of patent
 75. See MedCom USA, Inc. Has Organized and Named Its New Subsidiary 
Company, Card Activation Technologies, Inc., MEDCOM USA (Sep. 11, 2006), http://www. 
medcomusa.com/pages/displaynews.asp?id=52 [http://perma.cc/C7QK-76ML]. 
76. See Card Activation Advises No Further Enforcement Activities Can Be Taken
Concerning Its Patent, CARD ACTIVATION TECHNOLOGIES (Dec. 18, 2012), http://www.
cardactivationtech.com/news_detail.php?news_id=144 [http://perma.cc/U8SB-R3PD]. 
77. Patent Troll Myths describes our methodology for finding NPE litigation data. 
See Risch, supra note 3, at 469–70. 
78. 35 U.S.C. § 290 (2012) requires district court clerks to notify the PTO when 
any patent litigation is initiated.
79. We noted the source and destination case numbers, such that movement of cases
might be studied in the future.
80. See, e.g., Feldman et al., supra note 9, at 60 (listing transfer and consolidation 
as the third and fourth most common case termination events but deducting them rather 
than tracing them); Haus & Juranek, supra note 23 (manuscript at 8–9) (dropping
transferred and consolidated cases, more than 25% of cases).
81. Defendant names were not recorded with precision; some cases had more than
100 defendants.  Additionally, we kept track of whether the NPE filed the case or was a 
declaratory relief defendant.
82. Case dispositions change on a daily basis, though this study allowed sufficient 
time to let most cases resolve.  The Author verified every merits outcome.  Other studies
have also tracked outcomes. See, e.g., Allison et al., Valuable Patents, supra note 5, at
88
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challenges—summary judgment motions—whether granted, denied, or 
pending at case dismissal.
D. Patent Identification and Data 
The next phase of the study identified the patents at issue in each of the 
litigation cases identified. The ten NPEs were involved in 917 unique 
litigations,83 which were consolidated into 752 final actions, 82% of the
total. These litigations involved 352 patents.  In turn, the 352 patents 
resulted from 176 initial patent applications, many of which spawned
multiple patents.  The maximum was 41 patents from one application. 
The matching litigation involved 1311 unique cases, which were 
consolidated into 1152 final actions, 88% of the total.  The litigations 
involved 791 patents stemming from 536 applications, and the maximum 
was 9 patents from one application. 
To find the asserted patents, we read the complaints, answers, motions, 
and other documents accessible in docketing databases.  We also—again— 
searched the PTO, Lexis, and Derwent/Litalert databases of litigation 
notices. As described above, we used patents discovered in each case to
identify additional litigation to include in the database.  Thus, litigation 
identification and patent identification were symbiotic: litigation led us to
patents and patents led us to other litigation. 
Many litigated cases involved multiple patents coming from the same
initial patent filing, emphasizing the repeated use of a relatively small
number of inventions.  The average number of litigations for each NPE
patent was 8.59 and for each NonNPE patent was 3.23.  The average
number of NPE patents per litigation was 3.35, and the average number 
of NonNPE patents per case was 1.96. However, the number of patents 
per case was highly variable year over year without a clear growth trend.
Further, there were comparable means between the parties for most years, 
except two during which there were significant outliers among the 
NPEs—mean of more than five patents per case—that skew the average.84 
437; Chien, supra note 23, at 1605–06; Kesan & Ball, supra note 8, at 246; Miller, supra
note 11, at 16–17; Shrestha, supra note 26, at 118. 
83. One had almost no information available and thus is not counted in most of the 
other tables in this Article.
84. Despite comparable means, a Fisher’s Exact Test shows a population difference 
with p=0.000. 
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This phase revealed a limitation of the study; prior to the introduction 
of electronic court filing in the late 1990s, PACER did not contain litigation 
documents.  Indeed, because complaints were always filed in paper form
to open a case, many districts did not make complaints available online 
until approximately 2002, even if they had adopted electronic filing rules. 
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As a result, there are a few cases with missing patents in the 2000s85 and 
several cases filed prior to 1999 that are missing patent data. 
Given that we searched by name for NPEs only, it is not surprising that 
the NPE data includes more missing patent numbers.  While finding cases 
by name revealed cases with missing patent data, if we started with the
patent data then our work was already done once we found a case.86  Even
with gaps, we were remarkably successful at identifying patents at issue.
We missed patent data for forty-two NPE cases and nineteen nonNPE
cases, almost all before 2000 and many before 1990.87 
We were able to obtain outcome information for virtually all of these 
missing cases, and none that we could locate included a judgment on the
merits of an unknown patent.  Further, because NPEs typically litigated
the same patents multiple times, it is likely that many of the cases for 
which data is unavailable involved the same patents already included in
the study.88 
Patent data included the patent number, patent filing and issue dates, 
technology classifications, total number of claims, inventors and assignees,
and number of continuations.89  We also determined the earliest claimed 
priority date for each patent.  Patent citation data were gathered, including 
references cited—backward cites—and citing patents—forward cites.90 
85. Many gaps were filled using litigation notices, but not all court clerks followed 
the statute in every case.
86. However, this is not entirely so.  There were many errors in reporting cases by
patent data due to typos, machine coding errors, and linkings of extraneously named but 
not asserted patent numbers. This study is differentiated from many others because we 
verified each case by reading court documents where possible rather than relying on data
reported by a service. 
87. Rates Technology was the plaintiff in thirty-two of the forty-two cases, many
of which dated back to the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
88. Also, given that many commentators associate the rise of particular NPE
behavior with the 2000s, a data set covering post-1999 activity will still provide useful 
information. Of course, there might be a difference in the types of patents litigated now 
and those litigated before 2003.  However, most of the patents litigated after 2003 were 
issued before 2003 and were certainly applied for before 2003, such that this is a minor
concern.  Future studies might obtain paper court filings to determine the patents at issue 
in pre-1999 cases. 
89. No distinction was made between continuations and continuations-in-part, and
divisionals were not recorded. 
90. Forward citations were adjusted in two ways: by average per year and by
normalization by the average number of forward citations received in the same grant year. 
See Hall et al., supra note 59, at 434–41.  The latter method captures year effects for 
citations. 
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IV. ANALYSIS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This Part analyzes the data, primarily by comparing NPEs with nonNPEs.
Because so many diverse areas are being considered, each subpart contains
two further subparts: an analysis of the data and the primary policy 
considerations associated with the results. 
A. Case Complexity 
The first area of consideration is case complexity, which the Article
considers by defendant count and case transfers.
 1. The Data
Table 1 in Part III(B) above shows defendant counts by year, as 
reflected by the graph in Figure 2.
FIGURE 2 
The median litigation for each group for all years combined involved 
one defendant. Surprisingly, the nonNPE group had more years with a 
median of two defendants than the NPE group did.  However, the skew in
the data is unmistakable.  Beginning in 2006, the means and standard 
deviations in the NPE group begin to grow much larger—exceeding five 
in later years—reflecting the growth in mass patent litigation.91  In short,
91. One year for the nonNPEs includes a large standard deviation, but this is driven
by a single outlier. 
92
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run-of-the-mill litigation involved few defendants but more and more 
cases, though far less than half, included many more defendants, as many
as 200.
Cases that are transferred also increase complexity, especially those that
consolidate multiple cases into one, which essentially turns any litigation 
into a mass litigation.  Table 5 shows the number of cases transferred to
other districts or consolidated with other cases, including multidistrict
litigation.92 
TABLE 5 
While cases appear to grow more complex over time, a regression 
estimate on case duration shows that cases have actually gotten shorter as 
the years progress.  Further, various regressions suggest that taking into 
92. Multidistrict litigation consolidates cases pending in different federal district
courts for pretrial activities but then returns the cases to their original courts for trial. See
28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012).  In this study’s set, only one initial filing was returned for trial, 
and it settled shortly thereafter.  A few others settled as they were about to be returned for 
trial.  Thus, consolidation to a multidistrict litigation is, for most purposes, a consolidation.
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account case complexity, merits rulings, transfers, and other factors show 
that NPE cases are actually shorter, all other things being equal.93 
FIGURE 3 
The following model tests the various effects on duration:
Log(duration) = α + ∑βixi + ε 
where duration is the number of days between the filing of the complaint 
and the final disposition of a patent or case,94 α is the estimated intercept, 
βi are coefficients, xi are independent variables, and ε is error. 
The following table shows the results of four ordinary least squares
regressions with the following factors that one would expect might increase 
case complexity or otherwise affect the length of a case: 
1. NPE: 0 for nonNPE, 1 for NPE. 
93. A recent study also finds that NPE cases are shorter than other cases, all other 
things equal. See Haus & Juranek, supra note 23 (manuscript at 12).  However, this study
excluded transferred and consolidated cases, which are both important predictors for 
longer litigation and also more associated with NPEs.  See id. (manuscript at 8–9).  The 
regression in this study considers the interaction effects in order to capture which duration 
effects are associated with NPEs and which are merely due to the fact of transfer.  Further,
Haus & Juranek use docket entries as the measure of duration. See id. (manuscript at 11).  
This is possible for their random sample, but for the complex multidistrict litigation here, 
it fails.  The number of docket entries dealing with counsel changes, for example, is large, 
but this number has no bearing on duration. On the other hand, a single docket entry might 
stay a case for a year or more. 
94. Open cases were given an arbitrarily late date, December 31, 2013, rather than
excluded.  Because some patents were terminated from cases at different times, each patent
is a data point, but each data point was given an importance weighting based on the number
of patents in the case. Thus, a one-patent case would get full weight, and the durations of 
each patent in a four-patent case would get a one-fourth weight each.
94
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Dec. Relief: 1 if the case was only filed for declaratory relief. 

Xfer/Consol: 1 if the case was transferred to another district or 

consolidated with another case.
 
NPExXfer: an interaction dummy variable because NPE cases
 
are transferred disproportionately. 

Stayed: 1 if the case was stayed. 

Appeal: 1 if a judgment was appealed. 

AnyMerits: 1 if the court issued a merits ending ruling on 

invalidity, infringement, or unenforceability.95
 
NumPatents: the number of patents at issue in the case. 

NumDefs: the number of defendants sued in the case. 

Logclaims: the logarithm of the number of claims in the patent. 

Yearfiled: the year the case was initiated. 

2.	 Same as Regression (1), but with district court effects included. 
Every district was included in the regression, but only those that
were statistically significant are included.96 
3.	 Same as Regression (2), but with Xfer and Anymerits interaction 
effects removed as test of robustness. 
4.	 Same as Regression (3), but with NPExDistrict interaction
effects because NPEs choose some districts disproportionately. 
The regression suggests that many of the things that one might expect
to lengthen—or shorten—duration, such as whether a case is transferred, 
stayed, or appealed, actually do so.  Interestingly, when courts rule on the 
merits, cases tend to be longer,97 probably because of the briefing time, 
trial, potential appeals, and lack of settlement. Furthermore, factors that
increase complexity, such as the number of defendants and the number of
patents, increase duration, though the number of patent claims has no 
statistically significant effect.  Surprisingly, cases initiated each passing 
year are shorter on average, all other things equal.
95. Where possible, duration was recorded for each patent.  Only rulings that would
dispose of a patent issue are included.  A denial of summary judgment is not included 
because that would not shorten the case as to that patent.
96. Not surprisingly, the statistically significant districts were those with the most
case volume.
 97. But see Christina L. Boyd & David A. Hoffman, Litigating Toward Settlement, 
29 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 898, 918–19, 923 (2013) (finding that the filing of substantive
motions shortens duration). 
 95
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TABLE 6 
Exponentiated coefficients;98 p-values in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
98. Exponentiated coefficients in a log-linear regression can be read as a percentage
change in the nontransformed dependent variable.  For each unit the independent variable 
changes, the duration increases or decreases by the percentage above or below one.  Thus, 
a coefficient below one implies a decrease in duration.
96
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Given all other factors held equal, NPE cases tend to be shorter than 
nonNPE cases. Interestingly, transferred NPE cases are slightly longer
(13%) than transferred nonNPE cases on average, primarily due to
consolidation of many cases into very lengthy multidistrict cases.  On the 
other hand, nontransferred NPE cases tend to be much shorter than
nonNPE cases (by 44%).  Of course, not all factors are equal; NPEs are 
40% more likely to file a case that is eventually transferred or consolidated, 
which means that some NPE cases may well be longer because NPEs
select improper venues.  The inferences from this are ambiguous, though. 
If NPE cases that are transferred are longer, then this implies that these 
NPEs settle faster if they win their choice of venue, which is contrary to 
the conventional wisdom that NPEs walk away when cases transfer.99 
Duration is likely affected by district choices.  Caseload and patent data
by judge was not available for the entire timespan of the data, especially 
given transferred and consolidated cases.100  Thus, district effects were
modeled by including both district location (Regression (3)) and a district-
NPE interaction dummy (Regression (4)) because NPEs were more likely 
to choose certain districts. Although only three districts were statistically
significant, district selection as a whole was significant to the estimate.
Each of the significant districts’ coefficients was about 35%–65% longer 
in duration than the Central District of California, the baseline here.101 It 
is important to note, though, that these are the initial districts.  The final
district may be different, and this effect is captured in the transfer-
consolidation factor. 
However, a curious thing happens when district-NPE interactions are 
included. The coefficient on NPE becomes statistically indistinguishable 
from 1—meaning no effect.  The interaction factors, however, are virtually 
all less than 1, and many less than 0.5.102 Rather than imply that the other
regressions are not robust, this implies that duration is highly variable by 
district; however, in most districts, the duration for NPEs is much lower 
than for nonNPEs.
99.  Of course, some NPEs may do that, but not the most litigious. 
100. Cf. Haus & Juranek, supra note 23 (manuscript at 12–13) (using caseload and
patent propensity to isolate judge based effects on duration). 
101. See Mark A. Lemley, Where To File Your Patent Case, 38 AIPLA Q.J. 401, 
414–15 (2010) (showing the Central District of California with relatively short time to 
resolution, in part due to early disposition of cases). 
102. This includes unreported districts.  Although most were not individually
statistically significant, as a group they add explanatory power.
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a. Venue and Filing Rules 
The America Invents Act in 2011 (AIA) required that each defendant 
be sued in a separate case.103  The data here implies that the separate case 
requirement was warranted, but it only affected particular patent 
plaintiffs. In that sense, it was targeted not just at patent trolls but also at 
very particular patent trolls.
Separate case filing, along with more stringent venue rules,104 affected 
everyone. While NPE cases were more likely to be transferred, consolidated
with others, or both, nonNPEs filed plenty of cases—including 16% of
declaratory judgment cases filed by nonNPEs against competitors and NPEs
alike—that were later transferred or consolidated.105  Obtaining an improper 
venue advantage is not a purely NPE pursuit.  Though more cases were
transferred as time passed, they were never more than a minority.
b. The Rise of the Eastern District of Texas 
Table 7 shows the initial choice of venue over time in four popular 
districts: Central District of California, District of Delaware, Eastern
District of Texas, and the Northern District of California.  These are the 
venues in which cases were filed, not the final venue; many cases may
have been transferred in or out of districts after filing. 
The growth in plaintiffs using the Eastern District of Texas is
unmistakable, rising from zero in 2001 to 37% of all cases filed in 2007. 
But there are a few interesting data points to note.  First, the choice of that
district is relatively new, with no selection among these NPEs before 2002 
and no widespread adoption until 2005. It is likely that other NPEs filed
in the Eastern District of Texas prior to 2005 with positive results, and
these plaintiffs followed suit. Second, despite being considered a haven 
for these NPE plaintiffs, only about 19% of all cases were filed there as 
late as 2009, though the percentages were higher in the three preceding 
years.  Third, the number of NPE cases filed in the Northern District of
 103. See 35 U.S.C. § 299 (2012). 
104. See, e.g., In re TS Tech USA Corp., 551 F.3d 1315, 1318–19 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(applying Fifth Circuit precedent and reversing district court to allow transfer of case out 
of Eastern District of Texas); Efrén Garcia, Presentation at the Eleventh Annual Texas 
Intellectual Property Law Journal Symposium: Effects of In re TS Tech USA Corp. on 
Patent Cases in the E.D. Texas 28–29 (Feb. 19, 2010) (showing increased number of 
granted transfer motions). 
105. Theoretically, filing against many defendants would lower the number of transfers
because only one defendant’s venue need be proper.  In reality, this likely had little effect.
Many high defendant cases were transferred or consolidated. 
98
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California—consistently about twice the percentage as nonNPEs—is 
surprising given that cases filed in that district are less likely to be 
successful.106  Fourth, the Eastern District of Texas is not just for NPEs 
anymore.  While the percentage of cases filed is not as high, beginning in 
2005, nonNPEs filed a substantial number of cases—between 7% and 
9%—in the Eastern District of Texas.  
TABLE 7 
Finally, despite the continued popularity of the Eastern District of 
Texas, since the passage of the AIA, Delaware is now the most popular 
place to file a patent claim.107  This growth may seem surprising given the
percentages above, which show almost no filings in Delaware as late as 2009. 
The antijoinder provisions were intended to stem the tide of litigation but 
106. PwC 2014, supra note 11, at 18 (showing that NPEs win only 14% of their cases
in the Northern District of California, but 46% of their cases in the Eastern District of
Texas); Lemley, supra note 101, at 407–11 (showing below average win rates and 
likelihoods of trial in the Northern District of California). 
107. See James C. Pistorino & Susan J. Crane, 2011 Trends in Patent Case Filings: 
Eastern District of Texas Continues To Lead Until America Invents Act is Signed, PERKINS 
COIE  12–13 (March 2012), http://www.perkinscoie.com/files/upload/PL_12_03Pistorino
Article.pdf [http://perma.cc/E9BY-GEA8].
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have not done so. 
procedural restrictions. 
This implies that patent plaintiffs will merely adapt to 
c. Case Management 
A third lesson to draw from the data concerns case management.  For 
example, as courts have taken a more active role in more recent years, the
cases have actually grown shorter. 
However, the AIA was responsible for a large increase in the number 
of patent cases filed.108  Based on history, it is unclear what effect this will 
have. Both the NPE and the nonNPE data sets included sets of litigation 
that were consolidated into multidistrict litigation cases for all purposes 
other than trial. This had the practical effect of including many defendants 
together as if they had been sued at the same time.  To the extent that post-
AIA cases are consolidated, they may look very similar to pre-AIA cases.
However, many consolidated cases were only for pretrial actions, and 
when those pretrial proceedings were completed, cases were to be sent
back to their original districts.  Procedures that maintain separate cases 
but consolidate them for pretrial proceedings preserve the separate right 
to a trial for each defendant but create other problems.  First, pretrial
proceedings still require coordination, and some defendants may not want
to be consolidated even for pretrial.  Second, multidistrict litigation costs 
more than other cases with many defendants because defendants must find
counsel to defend them in two different districts: one district for pretrial 
and, if the case should go that far, the original district for trial.109 
Given the costs of consolidation, efficient case management probably 
dictates the current rule: filing separate cases against unrelated defendants. 
At the very least, each defendant will have an opportunity to argue
noninfringement based on different product configurations.  Further, cases 
may be resolved more simply.  The number of docket entries seemed to
 108. See GAO, supra note 21, at 14–15. 
109. Plaintiff costs can also rise.  Remand from multidistrict proceedings gives
defendants another opportunity to seek delay or otherwise avoid a trial with a new judge 
unfamiliar with the case history.  For example, in In re Katz Interactive Call Processing
Patent Litigation, Defendant Geico objected to a remand, but its argument that more 
summary judgment challenges should be allowed in multidistrict litigation was rejected. 
See Conditional Remand Order at 1–2, In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Litig., 
MDL No. 1816, No. 07-cv-00361-GMS, ECF No. 48 (J.P.M.L. June 5, 2013). Geico 
nonetheless moved for another stay pending reexamination of the patent and also argued
that further claim construction was necessary.  See Joint Statement Pursuant to Local Rule
81.2, Ronald A. Katz Tech. Licensing L.P. v. Geico Corp., No. 07-cv-361-GMS (D. Del. 
June 28, 2013). 
100
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grow exponentially110 with consolidated cases, even as defendants settled 
out. Given that most cases settle before trial, bringing separate cases 
seems like a good use of judicial resources.
However, there is a cost to requiring nonconsolidation.  First, there is a 
likelihood of many more claim construction hearings—and conflicting 
ones at that—especially as patent reform proposals seek to hold discovery
until after claim construction.111  Courts will be faced with patentee
arguments—with debate about the estoppel effect of any nonfinal 
construction in another case—defendant arguments, and orders from 
other cases, if any.  All of this is supposed to be done with an eye toward 
determining which claim terms are important to the particular litigation 
heard by the court.112  This is a potentially costly exercise. 
d. Reporting
There is one more problem caused by cases with many defendants: they
are much harder to study.  This consideration is relatively minor in the 
scheme of things; the courts should not be organized to make it easier for 
professors and the media to find out who won which case and how.  Even
so, consolidation has a significant impact on how data is reported. 
Quite often, a consolidated case with hundreds of defendants will lead
to settlements with defendants over a period of time on varying terms; in 
some cases the defendant will pay, and in others the plaintiff will be 
convinced there is no infringement.  But the final challenge is often only 
by a single defendant.  The final judgment of the case—and more importantly 
the media—will usually reflect only the final merits outcome of a single 
defendant, despite a long history of other outcomes associated with each
of the other defendants. 
110. See Eugene Volokh, Careful With Those Scientific Allusions, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY
(Jan. 5, 2008, 2:00 PM), http://volokh.com/2008/01/05/careful-with-those-scientific­
allusions [http://perma.cc/9FWG-8WET] (“‘Exponential increases’ does communicate 
‘large increases,’ in a way I have to grudgingly accept (down, math pedant self, down!).”). 
111. See Patent Progress’s Guide to Federal Patent Reform Legislation, PAT.
PROGRESS, http://www.patentprogress.org/patent-progresss-guide-patent-reform-legislation
[http://perma.cc/WH3T-5BVY] (last visited Mar. 30, 2015). 
112. See Jeff Steck, Construing Claims “Without Reference to the Accused Device”
Is Put to the Test, PATENTLY-O (Mar. 23, 2006), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2006/
03/construing_clai.html [http://perma.cc/73J2-UGMQ] (“[T]he Federal Circuit has sent 
the message that a district court’s claim construction must include some analysis of the
accused products.”). 
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Those who believe the patent system is already broken would likely
argue that being able to study each of the settlement outcomes adds little 
value. They might argue that if the patentee loses against the lone holdout, 
then such a loss proves that all of those earlier settlements must have been
due to strong-arm tactics or cost of litigation attrition.  One problem with 
attributing a single loss to all prior settlements, though, is that those who 
believe this system is broken do not make the same assumption about prior 
settlements when the patentee wins against the final holdout defendant.113 
Instead of recognizing that perhaps the patentee had a valid claim and the 
other parties rationally settled to avoid risk of loss or to receive a discount 
for settling early, winning patentees are often portrayed as lucky and
likely to lose on appeal.114  Thus, complex litigation can mask all of the
underlying settlement activity in a case, for better or worse.  It would 
better serve transparency if each case outcome were clearly recorded with
respect to each defendant. 
B. Non-Merits Outcomes 
A longitudinal analysis of asserted, adjudicated, and dismissed litigation 
provides a broad look into the patent landscape.  As others have reported,115 
most patent cases end with some sort of settlement or other dismissal.  It 
113. See, e.g., Allison et al., Patent Quality, supra note 5, at 687 (listing eight trial 
wins among the most litigated patents but not counting prior settlements with other
defendants in those cases as wins). 
114. See Joe Mullin, Jury: Newegg Infringes Spangenberg Patent, Must Pay $2.3 
Million, ARS TECHNICA (Nov. 25, 2013, 9:20 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/
2013/11/jury-newegg-infringes-spangenberg-patent-must-pay-2-3-million [http://perma.cc/
JHE4-B2DA]; see also Mike Masnick, Insanity Rules in East Texas: Jury Finds Newegg 
Infringes on Ridiculous Encryption Patent, TECHDIRT (Nov. 26, 2013, 5:44 AM), https:// 
www.techdirt.com/articles/20131125/23252625370/insanity-rules-east-texas-jury-finds­
newegg-infringes-ridiculous-encryption-patent.shtml [https://perma.cc/37P8-TS5B] (describing
TQP win: “It shows how arbitrary jury trials can be, especially when you have jurors who
simply don’t understand the technology or the history at play.”).  Of course, sometimes 
they do lose on appeal. See, e.g., Joe Mullin, How Newegg Crushed the “Shopping Cart” 
Patent and Saved Online Retail, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 27, 2013, 1:00 PM), http:// 
arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/01/how-newegg-crushed-the-shopping-cart-patent-and 
-saved-online-retail [http://perma.cc/C859-L63V] (describing loss on appeal by Soverain
Software).  But, sometimes they win.  See, e.g., Kirk Teska, The Story Behind the BlackBerry
Case, IEEE SPECTRUM (Mar. 1, 2006, 5:00 AM), http://spectrum.ieee.org/consumer­
electronics/gadgets/the-story-behind-the-blackberry-case/0 [http://perma.cc/8TEC-MJDE]
(describing infringement litigation regarding BlackBerry’s e-mail technology); Tom Krazit 
& Anne Broache, Blackberry Saved, CNET NEWS, http://news.cnet.com/BlackBerry­
saved/2100-1047_3-6045880.html [HTTP://PERMA.CC/S598-ZSZL] (last updated Mar. 3,
2006, 4:00 PM) (reporting the $612.5 million settlement after NTP won on appeal). 
115. See Allison et al., Patent Quality, supra note 5, at 680; Allison et al., Realities 
of Patent Litigation, supra note 8, at 1777; Feldman et al., supra note 9, at 59–60; Lemley,
supra note 101, at 405. 
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is difficult to tell which party was favored in each settlement, and we did 
not systematically record this information.  We did, however, collect
information about default judgments, consent judgments, and dismissals 
that did not appear to be settlements.
Table 8 lists summary data for outcomes for each initial case. There
were, of course, fewer final cases after consolidation.  However, tracking 
outcomes by the initial case allowed the ability to track settlements with
some parties that exited consolidated suits while others remained in the 
suit. 
The table first lists settlements and consent judgments, which together 
constitute all settlements. It then lists injunctions, most of which were 
obtained as part of consent or default judgments.  Finally, it lists other
ways that cases were terminated, such as procedural terminations for lack 
of personal jurisdiction or, in the case of declaratory relief actions, lack of 
case or controversy.  It then lists cases with a merits ruling, cases that have
been stayed, and cases that are open.  There is some overlap in these
categories, as there might be two types of merits rulings, or there might 
be a merits ruling but the case is still open on appeal. 
TABLE 8 
Coding case resolution was necessarily a judgment call because the
reasons for termination were not always clear.  We coded for a settlement
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primarily when the documents in the case, the timing, or the state of the
docket made it relatively clear there was a settlement.116  We surely  
missed many. 
As a result, about 45% of the cases were left in an “other dismissal” 
category.  Most of these were likely settlements of one sort or another, 
though undoubtedly some of the dismissals were to avoid a negative 
judgment.  The normative implications will depend in part on (a) whether 
one views a walkaway as a settlement, and (b) one’s guess at how many
dismissals were to avoid an invalidity judgment.  Note, however, that merits
rulings were recorded so that dismissals to avoid a negative judgment after 
a summary judgment loss do not affect the merits findings.  Furthermore, 
the count of summary judgment motions pending at dismissal is reported 
in later sections. 
When consent judgments are included, the nonNPEs settled more than
the NPEs, 39% of cases to 34%.  This does not lend too much support to
prior studies—and the conventional wisdom—finding that NPEs prefer to
settle more often. 
However, it should be no surprise that nonNPEs prefer to settle if the 
defendant is agreeing to an injunction, and it may be that nonNPEs are 
using the same few patents to obtain consent judgments.117  A look at
settlements by patent sheds more light on this question because many
cases involve multiple patents, each leveled at different defendants.  Table 
9 shows resolution statistics but this time counting patents rather than 
cases settled.  
When viewed through the lens of patents, the differences between the 
two groups become stark.  While only 55% of the cases in each group had
some measurable resolution, a total of 67% and 78% of nonNPE and NPE 
patents, respectively, had at least one outcome.
More importantly, the settlement percentages are much more differentiated. 
Only 29% of nonNPE patents were involved in a settlement, and 18% 
were the subject of a consent judgment.118  For the NPEs, 48% of all
patents were part of some settlement, with another 19% in consent judgments.
116. For representative/comparative purposes, the verifiable outcomes, such as 
consent judgments and defaults, match the outcomes of all litigation from 1995, 1997, 
2000, and 2002.  See Ball & Kesan, supra note 8, at 28.  However, the judgment-based
calculations do not match, presumably because this study was more conservative about 
calling cases a settlement.
117. Monsanto, for example, obtained seventy-four consent judgments using just 
two or three patents, and Mag Instruments obtained another twenty-four. 
118. Unlike the case data, these two counts cannot be combined for patents. Because 
patents are asserted in more than one case, there were patents that were settled in one case
and subject to a consent judgment in another. 
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This equates to 70% of all resolved nonNPE patents and 86% of all 
resolved NPE patents being settled at least once. 
TABLE 9 
This difference from the case-by-case settlements implies that the NPE 
propensity to assert more patents often yields more settlements associated
with those patents, even if it results in many cases that wind up not looking 
like a favorable settlement. 
Finally, this data challenges the conventional wisdom that 90% or more 
of cases settle. For these NPEs, at least, procedural dismissals entailed
more than 7% of the outcomes, and merits rulings involved at least another 
10% of all original cases filed—though, as discussed below, a much
smaller percentage of final consolidated cases.  Thus, no more than 85% 
of the NPE cases could ever settle, and many of these are disposed of by 
default judgments and “other” dismissals.119  It is true that very few cases
go through to trial, but not all cases are settling.120 
119. Other than three exceptions, consent judgments were also coded as settlements. 
However, they are not included in the settlement tally here.
120. The rate of pretrial resolution is consistent with all cases, including the growth
in pretrial challenges in recent years. See Gene Quinn, Patent Litigation Statistics: 1980– 
2010, IPWATCHDOG (Aug. 2, 2011), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2011/08/02/patent­
litigation-statistics-1980-2010/id=17995 [https://perma.cc/ZQP6-72SQ?type=pdf].
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C. Invalidity Outcomes 
Economists often judge a patent’s quality by the technology breadth it
covers.121  This study prefers a more basic metric of patent quality: whether 
the patent is valid.122  Thus, one of the most important results of this study 
is a comparison of validity outcomes between highly litigious NPEs and 
a random group of nonNPEs. 
1. The Data
Table 10 shows the basic data associated with those patents whose 
validity was tested on the merits.  The table shows cases adjudicating the
merits: patents found valid (technically not invalid), patents held partially 
invalid—and partially not invalid—and patents in which all the asserted 
claims are invalid.  The table also shows cases in which challenges— 
summary judgment motions by accused infringers—were denied123 and in
which challenges were pending when the case was dismissed. 
The table reports two percentages for each group.  The first is the percent 
occurrence for each outcome among all of the patents asserted.  The second 
is the percentage of each outcome among only patents that were tested. 
TABLE 10 
121. See, e.g., Trajtenberg et al., supra note 5, at 60–63 (defining generality and
originality).
122. A follow-up article will consider technology distribution.  Michael Risch, The 
Layered Patent System, 101 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2016). 
123. Motions by patent owners were not recorded unless granted because they did
not test the patent.
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FIGURE 4 
When considered as a percentage of those patents actually adjudicated, 
the NPE patents performed much more poorly than nonNPE patents. 
When challenged, some or all of the claims were invalidated slightly more
than 50% of the time, compared to 25% for nonNPEs.  The summary
judgment attempts were denied at about the same rates, at around 30%. 
Interestingly, the nonNPE group had a higher dismissal rate with summary 
judgment challenges pending (19% to 13%) than the NPEs.  This is contrary
to a view that these NPEs dismiss rather than see their patents challenged.
The primary difference appears to be the much higher percentage of 
patents found valid among nonNPEs, a phenomenon discussed further
below. 
In the end, about 12% of the NPE patents asserted over twenty-five 
years were invalidated either partially or completely.  The remainder 
either went untested or survived pretrial challenge.124  The many untested
patents lived on for other cases filed after 2009, but the data does not allow 
any inferences about their validity.
Looking at only patents reveals just part of the story, however.  Most 
cases do not involve any invalidated patents or even any challenges testing
patents. As the Table 11 shows, merits rulings occurred in even fewer
contested cases.  The following table summarizes the percentage of 
final—consolidated—cases in which patents where challenged, validity
124.  A survival of trial challenge would result in a validity finding. 
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rulings issued, or both.125  The columns are the same, first reporting 
percentages of all cases and then reporting percentages of cases involving 
a tested patent. 
Table 11 also adds new information unavailable in other studies: an
accounting for patents asserted in cases but later held invalid.126 
This table shows that patents are partially or completely invalidated in 
45% of all the NPE cases that tested at least one patent.  This is slightly 
less than the 51% tally when measured on a per patent basis, which means
that the invalidated patents are bunched into fewer cases.127 The
percentage of cases invalidating nonNPE patents remains about the same,
at 25%, presumably because there are fewer patents in such cases and
fewer consolidations. 
TABLE 11 
125. There were duplicates because multiple patents were tested in each case;
duplicates were eliminated so that the most relevant holding of the case is reported.
126. Technically, they could have been held partially invalid in an earlier case as 
well.
 127. But see Allison et al., Realities of Patent Litigation, supra note 8, at 1796 
(noting that when multiple patents were asserted in a case, patentees were more likely to
avoid loss). 
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FIGURE 5 
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Indeed, invalidated patents tend to group together in just a few cases.
One reason for this may be that the patents are related.  This is certainly 
true of invalidity findings in cases brought by Ronald A. Katz Technology 
Licensing. Allison, Lemley, & Walker call these patents the “Katz Effect” 
because the company filed so many cases based on so many patents.128  In
this study, Katz had ten patents partially or completely invalidated in a 
single ruling in a single case129—all based on one defective patent
application.
A remaining key question is what happens in all of the cases—the vast
majority—where courts do not invalidate a patent.  The NPE-invalidated 
patents occurred in less than 3% of the cases, which means that only 21 
out of 752 cases involved a partially or completely invalidated patent.130 
Four cases involved patents held valid, and the other 727 cases did not
result in any kind of final merits ruling. This percentage is consistent with 
other cross-sectional studies of outcome.131 
Here, there are some similarities and some differences between the
studied groups.  A similar percentage of cases led to the denial of all summary 
judgment challenges, about 2%.  About twice as many of the nonNPE 
cases dismissed/settled with a challenge pending, but still less than 2%. 
That leaves about 93% of nonNPE cases in which the validity of the 
patents is not challenged. A 3% chunk of the untested nonNPE cases 
involved patents that were later invalided.  The NPE group saw a similar 
93% of cases with untested patents.  However, the portion of cases
involving a patent partially or completely invalidated in later cases is 
much larger, at 17%.  The effect of this difference is ambiguous. On a 
comparative basis, these NPEs were more than five times as likely to 
assert a patent of lower quality, and many settlements occurred based on 
patents that were later invalidated in whole or in part.  Nonetheless, the
plaintiffs’ belief in validity at the time of assertion is unknown.  Further, 
on an absolute basis, this still leaves 77% of the cases asserting patents 
with no challenge, no invalid patent, and no assertion of a patent later
invalidated. Thus, while the impact is certainly disparate, the data does
 128. See Allison et al., Most-Litigated Patents, supra note 24, at 26. 
129. There had been more, and some were partially revived on appeal.  See In re
Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Litig., 639 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
130. When recalculated by preconsolidated cases, the percentage is higher: 113 cases 
out of 916, about 12%, resulted in an eventual invalidation of some or all of a patent claim.
But even this is a relatively small percentage of all cases.  The compression of 113 
preconsolidation cases down to twenty-two final cases implies that the preconsolidation
cases most likely to involve invalidations are those with many patents or those with the
same patents used many times against different defendants.  For nonNPEs, by contrast, 
thirty-two preconsolidation cases compress to twenty-two postconsolidation cases.
131. See Kesan & Ball, supra note 8, at 275–76. 
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not allow any inferences about plaintiffs’ prescience of which patents 
would eventually be tested and invalidated and which would not.
As the table shows, a key difference in merits outcomes is findings of
patent validity. The nonNPE group had many more patents survive into
trial, where the patents were upheld overwhelmingly and there were no
appeals to test the jury’s verdict.  This is a marked difference from the 
NPEs, which preferred to settle their cases rather than go to trial.  That is, 
there are selection effects at play.  First, only the weakest patents are likely
to be the subject of invalidation rulings; for many patents untested on the 
merits, summary judgment is denied132 and parties often settle. Second, 
the NPEs were more likely to settle, even if they survived summary
judgment challenges.  That is, NPEs select into settlement rather than trial. 
This is not to say that there are no selection effects the other way.
Competitors may settle to maintain business relationships.  Further, nonNPEs 
are more likely to get an injunction,133 which may change settlement
dynamics.  Nonetheless, NPE preference for settlement is relatively well 
documented—including in this Article134—and the data imply that NPE
preferences to avoid trial outweigh nonNPE preferences.
This Article cannot answer what the 80% of cases involving untested 
patents and cases with pending and denied motions say about patent quality.
Some believe that small settlements—under $2 million—make them nuisance 
cases and that NPEs will drop or settle as soon as defeat looks likely. There 
is surely some truth to this, though the small number of cases settled with
motions pending does not strongly support the notion.  Others believe that 
one cannot know whether a patent will be meritorious until it is actually
tested and NPEs are simply asserting their rights.  There is likely truth to 
this as well. And the truth may well apply differently to different entities.
Whether one considers such settlements a nuisance or not, the fact
remains that many settled patents may have been found valid if they were 
132. See Allison et al., Realities of Patent Litigation, supra note 8, at 1785 (finding
that 70% of invalidity motions for summary judgment were unsuccessful for all cases filed 
in 2008 and 2009). 
133. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396–97 (2006) (describing
licensing firms as less likely to obtain injunctions).
134. See, e.g., Ashtor et al., supra note 27, at 959 (finding NPEs more likely to 
settle); Ball & Kesan, supra note 8 at 20–21 (finding that licensing firms are more likely
to settle); Haus & Juranek, supra note 23 (manuscript at 2) (“[W]e find that NPE cases are
indeed resolved significantly faster.”).
 111



























   
 
taken to trial.135  When only judicially examined trial outcomes are at 
issue, the invalidation rates for NPEs and nonNPEs are much closer. 
Table 12 presents invalidity findings with trial verdicts removed.  Thirty 
of the thirty-five nonNPE patents found valid at trial were not appealed. 
TABLE 12 
On an absolute basis, the number of patent invalidations is essentially
the same as before.  This is expected because the column measures how 
many patents in the entire population are invalidated rather than simply
counting percentages of those patents that happen to make it to a merits 
ruling.
The column measuring the percentage of tested patents shows how 
sensitive the reporting is to the number of patents found valid.  When 
patents held valid—more technically not invalid—but not tested on appeal 
are removed, the nonNPE invalidation rate gets closer to the NPE 
invalidation rate, moving from 25%:51% to 33%:51%, with an additional
7% increase in cases dismissed with challenges pending.  In other words, 
one reason why nonNPEs have a smaller portion of invalidated patents is 
patents held valid without appeal—often by juries, an admittedly easier
audience136—crowd out the other categories.  When the selection 
preference for trial is negated, nonNPE patents are invalidated at a higher 
rate, though still not as high as NPE patents. 
In other words, it could be—though we have no way of actually
knowing—that if more NPE cases were tried and then settled without an 
135. See PwC 2014, supra note 11, at 19 (showing that company NPEs from 1995–
2013 won 25% of all their cases that reached a definitive merits ruling). 
136. See id. at 8, 10–11 (showing differential win rates for bench trials, jury trials, 
and at the summary judgment stage). 
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appeal,137 then the invalidation rates even among those adjudicated patents
would match nonNPE rates. 
This exercise is not meant to make a statement about the quality of 
patents so much as the reporting about the quality of patents.  After all, 
NPE patents are still invalidated about twice times as often.  Instead, the 
revised table shows that validity findings—which are not really findings
at all, given that the next case can invalidate the same patent—are 
unhelpful in reporting patent quality.
2. Bases for Invalidity 
Table 13 lists the primary bases for invalidity for each of the two 
groups.
The numbers are too small to reach any definitive conclusions, but two 
results—and a missing result—stick out.  First, the NPE patents were 
far more likely to be invalidated for lack of written description and 
definiteness.138  However, the result is subject to the Katz Effect.  Ten of 
the thirteen NPE patents invalidated on written description were owned
by Ronald A. Katz Technology Licensing, and they were all defective for 
very similar, if not the same, reasons.
Second, more of the NPE patents were invalidated based on statutory
bars of publication and use more than one year before the filing date.  On 
the other hand, nonNPE patents were invalidated on anticipation—based
on the invention date—and obviousness—based on combining references.
The reasons for these differences are unclear.  It may be that the litigious 
NPEs were more likely to assert patents on inventions that were old, 
whereas nonNPEs were more likely to assert patents on improvements. 
137.  Consider a recent case involving Soverain, whose patent was affirmed as valid 
by a jury, like so many nonNPE patents.  Newegg, found to have infringed on Soverain’s
patent, vowed never to settle and appealed to reverse the judgment. See Mullin, How 
Newegg Crushed the “Shopping Cart” Patent and Saved Online Retail, supra note 114. 
138. A written description determines whether patentees described enough to show 
that they possessed the full claim scope, not whether the patent taught others to practice 
the claim. See Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
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TABLE 13 
Third, notably absent are any invalidations based on patentable subject
matter. Patent cases filed in 2008 and 2009 saw growth in such
invalidations,139 but none of the patents in the study were invalidated on
that basis. This may weakly support the conclusion from Patent Troll 
Myths that the patents asserted by these particular NPEs were not all
business methods140 at the cost of weakly undermining the view that these
NPEs are like other NPEs. A more likely explanation may just be that
subject matter invalidations were new and rare at the time of this study.
3. Reexamination 
Reexamination provides a different way to consider patent quality. 
During reexamination, the PTO reconsiders all of the claims of a patent,
confirms validity of some claims, cancels some claims as invalid, and 
allows amendments and added claims.  Several of the stays and “other
dismissals” in the data were due to reexamination and invalidation of
patents at the PTO. 
Table 14 shows reexamination results for the patents in this study. 
139. See Allison et al., Realities of Patent Litigation, supra note 8, at 1782. 
140. Risch, supra note 3, at 475–77. 
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TABLE 14 
As the table shows, a slightly higher percentage of NPE patents were 
reexamined, though each reexamined patent faced the same average 
number of challenges.141  The most striking difference between the two
groups is the number of patents in which some, but not all, of the claims 
were held invalid. Surprisingly, the percentage of patents in which all
claims were held invalid is smaller for the NPE group.142  Because
patentees can amend in reexamination, it is not surprising that higher 
invalidity findings were coupled with more amended and added claims. 
An interesting question is whether the PTO is ruling on the same patents 
in the same way as the courts.  It turns out that it is not. There is very little 
correlation between the patents adjudicated by the PTO, and the rulings 
are not highly correlated with litigation rulings. 
Table 15 shows the correlations in rulings.  Only two correlations are 
significant (p<0.01), and none of the others were below the 5% threshold.
141.  A patent can be reexamined multiple times. 
142. See Brian J. Love & Shawn Ambwani, Inter Partes Review: An Early Look at
the Numbers, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 93, 94 (2014), https://lawreview.uchicago. 
edu/sites/lawreview.uchicago.edu/files/uploads/Love_Ambwani_Dialogue.pdf [https://perma.
cc/8YP9-6Q3W] (finding NPE patents less likely to be invalidated in inter partes review).
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As the table shows, for nonNPEs, the greatest overlap is for validated 
patents. There is very little correlation otherwise.  Interestingly, the same 
correlation does not hold for NPEs.  Instead, the only statistically significant 
correlation is whether some, but not all, patent claims are invalid.
The lack of correlation is not terribly surprising.  Many of the stays 
granted in cases were to allow reexaminations to go forward.  If the
reexamination found a patent invalid, then it was not further tested in
litigation and would have been logged as an “other dismissal” without a 
ruling on the merits. 
4. Testing Measures of Patent Quality 
One benefit of measuring outcomes in every case, rather than just those
that resulted in a court order on the merits, is that the data allows for the 
first test of objective measures of patent “quality,” such as the number of 
claims, the number of references cited by a patent, and the number of 
references citing a patent have almost no bearing on whether a court will
eventually find the patent invalid.  Because so few patents are actually 
judged on the merits—fewer than 100 out of 1600 in our sample—it is 
nearly impossible to statistically test whether a patent—once tested on the 
merits—will be invalidated.  However, patents are asserted many times 
and most patents are never invalidated at all, either because they go 
untested or because they survive pretrial challenges and cases are settled
before trial. This allows for a sufficiently large sample to fully test what
116
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factors will lead to a likely invalidity finding of a given patent once 
asserted, as opposed to once tested.143 
The problem is essentially a two-step selection problem: which patents 
are selected for merits consideration and, once considered, which patents 
are invalidated. However, estimates using the Heckman selection method
revealed something curious: there is no correlation between those two 
questions. This is not terribly surprising because most of the factors one
would use to test patent quality, such as citations and claims, have no
statistically significant basis on outcomes.144 
But this is not to say that outcomes are random.  Using stepwise 
regression, this Article suggests that selection effects outweigh any
measurable patent quality effects in determining which patents are 
invalidated. 
The following table shows five successive logistic regressions.145  They
each test for a binary outcome: AnyClaimInvalid, which is 1 if the case
held any claim in the patent invalid and 0 if the case did not.  The
estimations test whether a case invalidated one or all of a patent’s asserted 
claims. 
Regression (1) tests whether courts invalidate patents using traditional 
patent quality metrics—with the existence of NPEs included, given that a 
primary goal is determining whether NPEs assert weaker patents.  The 
independent variables in estimate (1) include: 
NPE: Is the plaintiff one of the most litigious NPEs. 
Reexam-AnyClaimInvalid: 1 if the PTO found any claim invalid
during a reexamination, 0 otherwise. 
Reexam-Amended: 1 if the inventor amended a patent claim in
reexamination—presumably to avoid invalidity—0 otherwise.
 143. Miller, supra note 11, at 6–7, 52, attempts to estimate which patents in the 
general population would be invalidated. 
144. This study becomes part of the growing body of work that questions the use of 
such metrics for patent value, including Allison et al., Realities of Patent Litigation, supra
note 8, at 1798–99 (finding that patent citations do not affect validity outcomes), and 
David S. Abrams et al., Patent Value and Citations: Creative Destruction or Strategic 
Disruption? 21 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19647, 2013), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w19647 [http://perma.cc/DG54-LLX5] (finding that forward 
citations have U-shaped correlation with patent license value).
145. For robustness, errors in each regression are clustered by patent number because
identical patents are presumably not independent.
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Reexam-Added: 1 if claims were added to the patent in reexamination, 
0 otherwise. 
Log backwardcitations: The logarithm of the number of patents and
other references cited by the patent at issue. 
Log adjustedforwardcitations: The logarithm of the number of
patents that cite to the studied patent, adjusted by yearly cohort.
Log pendency: The logarithm of the number of days between the very 
earliest priority date of the patent and its issuance.146 
Log claimcount: The logarithm of the number of claims in the patent. 
Log prioritytosuit: The logarithm of the number of days between the 
earliest patent application date and the lawsuit; a larger difference 
reduces prior art and makes it harder to invalidate. 
Yearfiled: The year the case was filed.
Number of inventors: The number of inventors on a patent. 
Number of continuations: how removed from the original filing are
the claims?
The results of Regression (1) were a bit surprising. It was no surprise
that NPE patents would be much more likely to be invalidated.  Indeed, 
that factor seems to be doing all of the work because the NPE patents are
invalidated much more often.147  However, the fact that a patent claim was
invalidated in reexamination is not significant.  Although this is contrary
to expectations, it is not surprising; as reported above, correlation between
reexamination outcomes and invalidation in litigation is not high. 
However, adding claims in reexamination is statistically significant and 
associated with a large reduction in the likelihood of an invalidity finding. 
Perhaps this is because such patents with added claims survive stronger
than before, or perhaps because the added claims are narrower and more
difficult to invalidate. 
The only significant patent metric is backward citations, but the direction 
is surprising. One would think that more citations means the patent is 
stronger because it survived examination despite the PTO being aware of
more prior art.  Instead, more backward citations are associated with a
fairly substantial increase in the odds of invalidation.  The implications of 
this are discussed further below. 
Finally, the year the case was filed is not significant.  This is a bit 
surprising because the conventional wisdom is that asserted patents have 
146. As an alternative, the regressions using the number of continuations were also
tested with similar nonsignificant results. 
147. To be clear, this regression is testing invalidity in the original case, and in the 
original case, NPE patents are invalidated in whole or part about five times as often. 
However, because cases are consolidated, that ratio is reduced for final cases. These 
regressions use original cases because the selection effects can be better tested that way.
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become weaker over time.148  The fact that some cases remain open may 
not be a sufficient explanation; more cases are open from 2006/2007 than 
from 2008/2009, and many open cases have invalidity findings in any
event. 
Regression (2) adds several more factors that relate more to selection 
for challenge than to quality:
Reexamined: The number of times the patent has been
reexamined, either because the patentee sought to enforce the 
patent or because threatened defendants sought reexamination. 
Stayed: 1 if the case was ever stayed, 0 otherwise.  Cases are
often stayed pending reexamination by aggressive defendants, 
though there were a few bankruptcy stays. 
Xfer/Consolidation: 1 if the case was ever transferred or 
consolidated.  This too can imply an active defendant or a 
high-activity patent. 
NumDefs: The number of defendants in a case.  The more 
defendants, the more likely one will challenge the patent. 
Dec. Relief: Whether the case was solely a declaratory relief 
action by a defendant. 
PriorAssertions: The number of times the patent has been
asserted as of the case filing date, including the current case.
Cases filed on the same day have the same number assigned. 
TotalAssertions: The number of times the patent was asserted 
in all cases in the set. 
NumPatentsCase: The number of patents in the same case as
the studied patent. 
MeritInfringeRuling: Whether the judge or jury issued a ruling 
on infringement in favor of either party in the case.
Presumably, active cases will be more likely to have an 
infringement ruling.149 
148. Other unreported regressions suggested by others for results after claim 
construction—Markman hearings—and after 2006 yielded little differences, for example.
149. For a discussion on the overlap between validity and infringement rulings, see 
infra Part IV.D. 
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Exponentiated coefficients; p-values in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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The results of Regression (2) are somewhat less surprising.  Most of the 
factors that one would expect might lead a patent to be challenged are 
statistically significant.  Rulings on infringement especially appear to be
highly correlated with rulings on invalidity.  It appears that selection 
metrics play a more important role in determining whether a patent is
invalidated than quality metrics. 
The one surprise in Regression (2) is that NPE status is no longer
statistically significant.  Once other case factors are considered, such as
the number of defendants, the number of assertions, et cetera, whether the
party is an NPE adds little explanatory value.  This will be tested further 
in Regression (5). 
Regression (2) does expose one oddity: invalidity in reexamination is 
no longer significant.  On the other hand, whether a patent was reexamined 
is positively correlated but not significant either.  These two likely offset 
each other. 
Regression (3) drops the insignificant reexamination outcome factors, 
and the result is that the fact of reexamination is now statistically significant.
It appears that reexamination may be a selection factor as well; high 
impact patents are more likely to be reexamined and also more likely to 
be challenged in court.
Whether the court ruled on infringement is surely explanatory, but it
may overdetermine the model by capturing all of the unobserved reasons 
why some parties take their cases to judgment and others do not. 
Regression (4) tests this by removing the factor from the regression.  As 
the drop in Pseudo R2 shows, the model captures less of the variation, but 
the chi-squared statistic actually increases.  However, most of the other 
coefficients stay essentially the same, except for Xfer/Consolidate, which 
doubles. This implies that some of the same factors that led to more 
infringement rulings may have led to more transfers and consolidations.
To the extent that NPEs might assert more noninfringed patents—as 
discussed below—and also file cases subject to more transfers—as
discussed above—this means that NPE choices lead to patent invalidity 
decisions even if the quality of their patents might not. 
Finally, Regression (5) tests the NPE question directly.  It drops NPEs
from the regression, and finds it virtually unchanged.  NPE status has
almost no explanatory value above and beyond other measurable selection
effects. As noted, some of the factors relate to NPE status but do not fully
explain it. For example, an unreported regression replacing Xfer/ 
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Consolidate with NPE in Regression (5) does not lead to a statistically
significant result (p=0.065). 
These stepped regressions imply that, among the more than 5500 
opportunities for courts to invalidate a patent, the most statistically—and 
magnitudinally—significant factors influencing invalidation related to 
whether the plaintiff asserted a patent in a way that was more likely to 
invite a patent challenge. 
In Regression (4), NPE status yields a coefficient of nearly 2 and is 
nearly significant.  One question is whether a larger sample that included
less litigious NPEs—who win more often—or more individuals—who
lose more often—would change this.  The answer is unclear. In an 
unreported regression, inventor-owned companies and product companies
were significantly less likely to have their patents invalidated than
licensing-only companies.  Some of the inventor-owned companies were
in the nonNPE group.  Further, individual plaintiffs, which were only in 
the nonNPE group, and IP-licensing arms of product companies, which
were in both groups, did not see a single invalidation and were dropped 
from the regression.  This implies that while plaintiff type may be relevant
to patent invalidation, more granularity than “NPE” is required in
assessing likelihood of invalidity.
To be sure, there were unobserved patent quality factors that affected
whether to mount a challenge and whether that challenge was successful,
but those quality factors are neither on the face of the patent nor explained 
by aggregated NPE status.150 
Most counterintuitively, the more prior art cited by a patent, the more 
likely a patent was to be invalidated.  This is the exact opposite of what 
one would expect to see. The conventional wisdom is that more prior art
means that the claims have been “bullet-proofed” against prior art.  More 
likely, however, it appears that more prior art means that the claims are
the most likely to be aggressively challenged in patent office 
reexaminations—leading to more prior art citations—and more 
aggressively litigated—leading to more invalidity findings.151 
5. Policy Implications
Do NPEs really assert weaker patents than other patent plaintiffs?  The 
answer is yes, NPE patents are invalidated more often.  But the level of
150. Testing using NBER technology categories yielded little information. Most 
NPE patents were in group twenty-one, computer communications—so many that the 
results were unhelpful.  A future article will test whether software patents are invalidated 
more often.
 151. See, e.g., Lei & Wright, supra note 4 (manuscript at 4) (suggesting that patent 
examiners work harder to find prior art to invalidate weaker patents). 
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concern depends on how one frames the data.  Reporting invalidations as 
a percentage of all patents asserted makes the absolute difference appear
much smaller.  Reporting them as a percentage of all cases reduces the 
difference even further, and the absolute effect to less than three percent
of all cases filed. 
In other words, while any given NPE case was about twice as likely to 
result in invalidation, the magnitude of this difference was a blip in the 
patent litigation ecosphere, affecting less than 3% of all pending cases.
The quality of the remaining patents is ambiguous: settlements might 
occur because the patents are strong, because the patents are weak,
because defendants feared a jury, because the NPE sought a reasonable 
settlement that reflected the value of the patent, or because the NPE sought
a nuisance settlement that overvalued the patent but remained less than
trying the case. 
The regression estimates in this case imply that the NPE patents were
invalidated more often because the plaintiff sued more defendants more
often and more aggressively.  This implies that invalidation is largely
based on a combination of selection and unobserved patent quality 
characteristics.  It would be helpful to discover what factors might lead to 
the invalidation of a patent, but—at least among these parties—mere
status as a litigious NPE does not provide enough information. 
Furthermore, the data implies the PTO and the courts run on two
different tracks, examining different patents.  Patents that survive 
reexamination are tested in litigation, and vice versa.  This is a consideration 
for any policy considering delay of litigation for PTO proceedings. 
Thus, the invalidity findings have important implications.  First, they 
show that only a very small percentage of all patents asserted and an even 
smaller percentage of cases involve patents held invalid.  Second, they
show that patents tested at trial but not appealed tend to be upheld. Third,
they are important for what they do not show: whether the lack of NPE 
validity findings at trial is due to socially undesirable behavior by highly 
litigious NPEs or is otherwise indicative of quality of their patents. 
In this sense, this study both confirms and contradicts other studies to 
date. It is consistent with overall win rates reported in recent comprehensive 
studies.152  It contradicts other studies of only final rulings, showing that
the most litigious NPEs win far less often than NPEs generally.153  For the
 152. See, e.g., Allison et al., Realities of Patent Litigation, supra note 8.
 153. See PwC 2014, supra note 11. 
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most part, however, it provides data that is simply unavailable in other
studies of NPEs generally or of highly litigious NPEs specifically. 
The finding about backward citations is surprising and has an important 
policy implication: spending time and effort bulletproofing a patent, 
whether by the patentee154 or during a “gold plating”155 review, may be
wasted.156  If a patent is asserted multiple times, it will be invalidated 
regardless of such efforts. 
D. Infringement Outcomes 
A patentee must win two halves of each case: validity and infringement.
If the facts support it, noninfringement may be an easier defense, as it
requires no research in old prior art.157  This section considers infringement 
outcomes in this study.
1. The Data
Of specific interest are those cases in which patent infringement was
tested on the merits.  Table 17 shows cases with any infringement motion 
or trial on the merits.  The results are similar to invalidity—nonNPEs go 
to trial much more often, and when they do, they win more often.  The NPE
patents were found noninfringing almost twice as often: 53% of the tested
patents versus 28%. Additionally, another 15% of NPE cases—compared
to 1.5% for nonNPE—involved findings of noninfringement as to some
defendants in a case but not others.  The NPE patents were asserted against
more defendants at once, so this difference is not surprising.  Of the two
infringement findings in favor of NPEs, one was at trial with a $16 million
damages award and one was on summary judgment for the plaintiff and
is still pending. 
154. See F. Scott Kieff, The Case for Registering Patents and the Law and
Economics of Present Patent-Obtaining Rules, 45 B.C. L. REV. 55, 116 (2003) (identifying
problems with the ex parte nature of patent reexamination). 
155. See Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law’s Presumption
of Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 50 (2007) (“Congress or PTO officials should create a 
new opportunity for patent applicants to ‘gold-plate’ their patents—funding and submitting to
a vigorous review process in the PTO, and in return earning a significant presumption in 
favor of patent validity.”). 
156. This is supported further by evidence that patent examiners generally do not 
consider material cited by applicants.  Christopher A. Cotropia, Mark A. Lemley & 
Bhaven N. Sampat, Do Applicant Patent Citations Matter?, 42 RES. POL’Y 844, 853
(2013).
157. See generally Allison et al., Realities of Patent Litigation, supra note 8 (finding 
that defendants were much more successful in noninfringement motions than on invalidity
motions, and that the combination of the two meant that patentees win only 25% of the 
time).
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TABLE 17 
More than 14% of all the NPE patents asserted were found noninfringing 
at one point or another. This is almost twice the 8% of patents found 
invalid. More nonNPE patents were found noninfringing versus invalid 
as well.158  Further, the very small number of infringement findings for
these NPEs was surprising, as it is well below the win rate for all NPEs.159 
This illustrates concerns with defining NPEs as any company or person
that does not sell a product.  There is clearly a large variation in litigation 
merits among parties collectively called NPEs. 
Like invalidity, the noninfringement findings appear to be limited to
fewer cases than the percentage of patents.  This is not surprising, given 
that multiple patents are asserted in each case.  The following table shows 
the infringement data by original case number.  Unlike validity, in which
consolidated defendants will each attack the patent on similar grounds, 
infringement defendants in different cases will often have different products
and thus different bases for noninfringement.  Thus, reporting by original 
case rather than final case provides the appropriate level of granularity. 
158. See id. at 1784, 1790 (finding that noninfringement was a basis for defendant 
victory twice as often as invalidity).
159. See PwC 2014, supra note 11, at 19. 
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It appears that 14.2% of the NPE patents were found noninfringing in 
7.55% of the cases.  More importantly, an NPE case was about twice as 
likely to end with a noninfringement ruling.161 Even nonNPEs were subject 
to noninfringement rulings in many more cases than invalidity.
The data implies that a greater failing of NPEs and nonNPEs alike is
not the assertion of invalid patents—though that certainly exists—but 
instead the assertion of noninfringed patents.162  For NPEs, especially, this
is consistent with a “war chest” model, in which more broad and potentially 
lucrative patents are asserted against more and larger defendants as time
passes.163 
160. There were actually three such cases, but two were removed because the cases
were included in another category.
161. This is consistent with other cross sectional studies. See, e.g., Kesan & Ball,
supra note 8, at 275. 
162. See Michael Risch, What Is a Patent Troll?, PRAWFSBLAWG (Apr. 15, 2011,
4:50 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2011/04/what-is-a-patent-troll.html
[http://perma.cc/U88F-Q4ZR] (“Individuals are rarely called trolls.  One might think this 
is because of the garage inventor ethos.  I’m doubtful, though, because individuals become 
trolls when they gather enough resources and sue enough defendants to get noticed.  At 
that point, they may be more likely to try to stretch their patents to cover technologies that 
they did not invent.  This, I think, leads to the real definition for me—I think trolls are
trolls when they overreach.”)
163. See David L. Schwartz, The Rise of Contingent Fee Representation in Patent
Litigation, 64 ALA. L. REV. 335, 368 (2012) (“Rather than suing them all at once, the 
patentee asserts its patent in waves. Typically, weaker defendants are approached or sued 
initially.”).
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FIGURE 6 
However, one should not overextend inferences of the data.  Like 
invalidity, these results were only a small fraction of all the patents
asserted.  Motions for summary judgment were denied and left pending at
dismissal at nearly equal rates between the two groups.  A jury never saw
most of those cases, especially for NPEs, and they are not reflected here.
Thus, there may well be a selection effect: perhaps only the most clearly
noninfringing defendants filed and won motions, whereas the remaining 
85% or more of the cases included at least a colorable claim for infringement. 
 127
























    
Further, unlike validity, there is no principled way to tally patents asserted
that are found noninfringing in other cases because infringement is 
different for each defendant. 
Of course, a few of the NPE cases may have overextended the claims
and relied on a poor quality patent.  Table 19 shows infringement findings
for just those patents where all asserted claims are found invalid.  There 
is a noticeable overlap with noninfringed patents.  Of the 59 NPE patents 
found noninfringing, 11 were also found completely invalid.164  NonNPEs
fared little better and arguably worse—four of their infringed patents were 
found completely invalid, and eight of their noninfringed patents were 
also found completely invalid.  This leaves 39 NPE patents and 56 
nonNPE patents held noninfringing available to be asserted in other cases.
TABLE 19 
Table 20 presents findings of patent validity.  Only 21 of the original 
57 nonNPE literally infringed patents were found both fully valid and 
infringed. This odd result stems from the nature of validity challenges. 
Invalidity is a defense, so if there is no real evidence then the jury never
rules. Patentees simply win infringement without any validity ruling.  This
result is common in, for example, Monsanto cases where the patent is 
never seriously challenged.  The one NPE valid and infringed result is the 
one jury verdict in favor of an NPE—the other infringement finding came 
on a patent held partially invalid.  However, a finding of validity in the 
noninfringed cases allows the patent to be asserted in the future, such as 
the three NPE patents found valid but not infringed. 
164. Another 12 NPE patents were found noninfringed with some, but not all, of the 
claims held invalid.  The remaining claims could live another day.
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TABLE 20 
The final infringement comparison counts how many patents survived 
validity challenges at least partially intact but avoided any infringement
ruling at all on the merits—they were simply never tested, presumably 
due to settlement. The totals are relatively small: seventeen for nonNPEs 
and sixteen for NPEs. This was a bit surprising because one would expect
more settlements when patents survive validity challenges.  However, the 
small numbers may imply the opposite.  First, if the patents survive validity
challenge, then some patent holders—NPEs included—are unlikely to settle.
This may mean that at least some cases are not simply cost of litigation 
nuisance suits. Second, when a patent holder does reach, it tends to be a 
complete overreach—a weak patent stretched to the limits of claim breadth165 
such that very few losing patents escape judgment on both validity and 
infringement. 
Alternatively, judges could be predisposed against patent trolls, finding
against them in every way possible to end each case.  This is unlikely— 
with respect to this particular issue, at least—because NPEs and nonNPEs 
seem to have the same small rate of patents that survive challenge but 
avoid infringement. 
Finally, it could mean that there are several defendants that know they
are infringing but believe the patent is invalid.  They would maintain the 
case long enough to challenge validity but settle if they lose.  This would
explain these examples and perhaps those three patents that were found 
infringed but were later held invalid.166 
165. The broader patentees claim their patents to be, the more likely they are to be
invalid because more prior art might apply.
166. Note that two of those three—the NPE patents—were found invalid in different
cases.
 129




















   
   




Comparing infringement outcomes is a bit ambiguous from a policy 
perspective. On the one hand, infringement findings have little to do with 
the quality of the patent because they are based on the accused product or 
service.  On the other hand, lack of infringement success implies that a
party is bringing a meritless case.167 
In this sense, patent troll critics are attempting to have their cake and 
eat it too, claiming that the patents are software that is so broadly defined 
it covers everything but simultaneously bringing weak cases against 
products that do not infringe.  The data here helps settle that issue a bit: to 
the extent that courts actually rule on infringement, the NPE claims do not
seem to be overbroad—even though the patent owner might wish it were 
so. Instead, defendants who challenge infringement seem to be able to 
convince courts that their products are not covered by the patent.168  This
is not to say that the enterprise is costless; getting to that judgment costs 
time and money. However, that is a different problem than patentees 
asserting claims that are so broad that everything infringes.  Furthermore,
even though patents are not so broad as to be infringed, they are still ruled 
invalid, though for highly litigious NPEs this is often based on things
other than the prior art. 
Because adjudicated patents are such a small portion of the total, this 
small window does not tell us about all of the patents that resulted in
settlements. Some would argue that settled patents are the ones that are 
too broad or perhaps just nuisances. Others would argue that settled
patents are most likely to win and thus are never challenged.  The truth 
surely lies in between.
This data set provides more information than was available before: a 
number of cases ended in default judgments and consent judgments.  The 
damages sought in many of these cases were quite small—some as low as
$7500—implying that the suits may not have even been to extract a 
settlement based on litigation costs. As to the rest, unfortunately, the
answer depends on whether one thinks the unchallenged patents look like 
the challenged ones.  It is likely that the narrowest patents are challenged,
and therefore the untested patents are probably broader.  Just how much
broader is a difficult question.
 167. See Allison et al., Patent Quality, supra note 5, at 687 (finding a 10% win rate 
among the most litigated patents). 
168. See Mark A. Lemley et al., Does Familiarity Breed Contempt Among Judges 
Deciding Patent Cases?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1121, 1140–43 (2014) (finding that judges who
issue more merits rulings are more likely to find more noninfringement rather than 
invalidity).
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V. CONCLUSION
Patent policy in the age of NPEs has many moving parts.  The key is to 
find the right combination of rules and reforms to improve outcomes for 
all participants in the system.  This Article sheds light on patent quality
and outcomes among highly litigious NPEs and nonNPEs.  There are four 
key takeaways, among other interesting results. 
First, although a larger percentage of NPE patents were invalidated, 
very few cases involved an invalidated patent.  Second, predicting which 
patents were invalidated had more to do with case-specific factors, such 
as the number of defendants, than with objectively measurable patent 
quality indicators.  Third, once these factors are considered, whether the
plaintiff was an NPE was not statistically significant.  Of course, NPEs
made choices about who to sue and how many cases to bring.  But 
nonNPEs who made similar choices faced similar odds of invalidation for
the same choices.  Fourth, while still a small fraction of all cases,
noninfringement was a more common reason for NPE loss. 
Together, these findings imply some direction for patent reform
proposals. Rules targeted at specific entities would be missing the point
because plenty of invalid patents would still be asserted by nonNPEs.
Further, any rules designed to increase the likelihood that parties avoid 
settlement and instead seek judgments on the merits should be balanced 
against (a) the costs of getting to such judgments, and (b) the possibility 
that NPEs might win more often if their cases are pushed to the merits
rather than settled. After all, many motions for summary judgment were 
denied.  Of course, NPEs might not win, and so the goal should be 
reducing duration and costs.  Mutual fee shifting may be an option that 
serves these dual purposes because defendants would have an incentive to 
challenge, but it would also face the risk of driving up defense costs if the 
challenge is ill-advised.  Fee shifting might also make it easier for small
defendants to obtain contingency defense counsel. 
Furthermore, rules that make it easier to determine whether a case is
high-stakes enough to challenge may be helpful.  Improved certainty in
damages might help the parties make such determinations.  Ironically, the 
AIA’s requirement that each defendant be sued separately may not have
been a helpful change. Given that cases with many defendants were those 
most likely to see challenges and invalidation, forcing NPEs to sue
defendants separately may have reduced the likelihood of invalidation. 
Finally, early certainty about infringement might be the best place to 
focus reforms.  Early claim construction conducted in light of the accused
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product would give all parties a better, cheaper look at whether a case will
be successful. 
In all events, this Article provides data that might guide policy in the 
future. 
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